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Categorizing Chevron
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN* & R. DAVID HAHN †
What is the Chevron doctrine? Everyone knows Chevron as a doctrine
that has governed judicial review of agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes for more than thirty years. Yet courts and
commentators continue to disagree over how the doctrine works and
what it requires courts to do. Contributing to the disagreement is a
categorization problem: is Chevron a standard of review, a rule of
decision, or a canon of construction? Most cases in which courts might
apply Chevron can be resolved without answering that question, but
some cannot. Two recent debates about Chevron particularly raise the
categorization issue: whether the government can waive or forfeit
Chevron deference, and also whether or under what circumstances the
Supreme Court might overturn Chevron notwithstanding stare decisis.
This article contemplates Chevron’s categorization and the
implications of each alternative before explaining why Chevron is best
considered a standard of review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Chevron doctrine is ubiquitous. All lawyers, and a fair number of
nonlawyers, know about it.1 In the case of Chevron, however, knowing of the
doctrine really only gets a person so far. Broadly, Chevron calls for courts to
defer to reasonable interpretations2 of ambiguous statutory provisions offered
by the administering agency in formats carrying the force of law. Sometimes,
applying that doctrine is straight forward. In other instances, it is not.3
In describing the courts’ role in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a
statute, the Supreme Court in Chevron counseled that a reviewing court first
1 The Chevron doctrine has been discussed in multiple mainstream publications in the
past few years. See, e.g., Tyler Olson, In Supreme Court Dissent, Thomas Cites Thomas in
Arguing to Overturn Decision Authored by Thomas, FOX NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/in-dissent-thomas-cites-thomas-arguing-court-shouldoverrule-decision-authored-by-thomas [https://perma.cc/7PLV-4WF7]; Jeremy W. Peters,
Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courts-admini
strative-state.html [https://perma.cc/UEU7-Y7VC]; Jeffrey Pojanowski, The Curveball in
the Gorsuch Nomination, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/opinions
/curveball-in-gorsuch-nomination-pojanowski/index.html [https://perma.cc/JXR5-84FX];
George F. Will, Opinion, Gorsuch Strikes a Blow for Constitutional Equilibrium, WASH.
POST (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gorsuch-strikes-a-blowfor-constitutional-equilibrium/2018/04/20/78139ef6-43f2-11e8-bba2-0976a82b05a2
_story.html [https://perma.cc/G7BB-FUHN].
2 We recognize the extensive literature distinguishing the concepts of interpretation
and construction for statutes, the Constitution, and otherwise. See generally, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010);
Lawrence B. Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Chevron As Construction, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1465 (2020); Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing
Interpretation from Construction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095 (1995). Although we find this
literature insightful and not incompatible with our thesis, for the most part, we regard it as
tangential to our project. The Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence uses the terms
interchangeably. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 986 (2005); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417
(1992); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
For purposes of this article, we do the same.
3 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44; see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 226–27 (2001) (announcing that only agency pronouncements carrying legal force are
eligible for Chevron deference).
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should undertake its own inquiry into the statute’s meaning.4 “First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”5 So far, so good—evaluating statutory meaning is not easy, but it
is what courts do, whether or not an agency is involved. In a footnote to this
passage, the Court even instructed judges to use “traditional tools of statutory
construction” to ascertain congressional intent, much as they have always done.6
A more controversial aspect of the Chevron doctrine derives from what the
Court said next.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 7

The Court went on to describe statutory ambiguities as delegations of authority
to make policy and to contend that, “[i]n such a case, a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency.”8
Decades after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, courts and
commentators continue to disagree over how Chevron works and what it
requires courts to do. How ambiguous must a statute be before courts shift into
a deferential posture,9 and what makes an interpretation reasonable, and thus
worthy of deference?10 On its face, Chevron has two steps, but some argue the
4 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 843 n.9.
7 Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
8 Id. at 844.
9 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989

DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the
future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought.”); Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2137–38 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (Oxford Univ. Press 2014)) (noting
that judges observe clarity thresholds ranging from 55–45 to 90–10).
10 Scalia, supra note 9, at 521 (observing that different approaches to statutory
interpretation will yield different perceptions regarding the “range of ‘reasonable’
interpretation[s] that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference”).
See also generally Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of
Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996) (making the case for a
narrow Chevron step two focused purely on statutory interpretation outcomes); Ronald M.
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997)
(surveying different approaches to the reasonableness inquiry and advocating in favor of a
combination with State Farm arbitrariness or reasoned decisionmaking analysis).
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two steps are really one,11 plus the Court added a step zero many years ago,12
leading still others to contend we should add even more steps, or maybe already
have.13
Chevron has always been controversial,14 but lately the criticism has been
amplified significantly.15 To its critics, the Chevron doctrine has become the
Frankenstein’s monster of administrative law: a hideous “behemoth” that has
escaped its restraints and is wreaking havoc on its creator, the courts, the
Constitution, and the American public.16 By this account, Chevron routinely
forces judges to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes, and
thus requires courts to abdicate their judicial role and power.17
11 Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 597–98 (2009) (explaining the one-step Chevron); see also United States
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009)).
12 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (adopting the standard
that has been labeled step zero); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (coining the term); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191–94 (2006) (identifying and analyzing Mead’s
step zero).
13 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1339, 1339, 1361–63 (2017) (mapping an entire “staircase” of “interstitial steps” within
Chevron analysis); Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758–60 (2017) (counting all of Chevron’s potential steps).
14 For just a few of the many articles criticizing Chevron over the years, see Christopher
Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J.
561, 587–88 (describing Chevron as “the Supreme Court’s conceptually flawed effort to
control the inclinations of some lower court judges to impose their politically unaccountable,
unreconstructed New Deal prejudices to push the bureaucracy toward an aggressive
regulatory stance”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (describing Chevron as “a
siren’s song, seductive but treacherous” as it changes the allocation of power among the
federal government’s branches); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678–80 (2007) (suggesting that Chevron misunderstands agencies’
“operational, policy-implementing role”).
15 See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691–94 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Chevron is in serious tension with the Constitution,
the APA, and over 100 years of judicial decisions.”); Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft AntiChevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 47–49 (2018) (highlighting recent
Supreme Court opinions that are either openly or covertly critical of Chevron).
16 See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Penguin Classics 2003).
17 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising [independent] judgment, forcing
them to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of
an agency’s construction.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron step two tells us we must allow an executive
agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous statutory provision. In this way, Chevron
seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”), vacated,
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Underlying and perhaps even driving some of the angst and rancor is
disagreement over exactly what kind of legal doctrine Chevron is. To some,
Chevron operates as a rule of decision that dictates case outcomes, forcing
courts to decide cases contrary to their own perceptions of what the law
requires.18 Indeed, some of Chevron’s harshest critics seem to view Chevron
this way, undoubtedly at least in part because the Supreme Court at times has
used mandatory rhetoric in describing the doctrine’s application.19 Others think
of Chevron as a standard of review—a judicial “mood” that affects how parties
structure their arguments and how a court perceives its role vis-à-vis agencies,
but that is flexible and not so outcome determinative.20 Finally, still others have
suggested that Chevron more closely resembles a canon of statutory
interpretation, with the Supreme Court conducting its own statutory inquiry and
treating the agency’s interpretation more as a “plus factor” to justify an
interpretive result.21 By that view, Chevron may be regarded as merely one of
many tools that guide but do not dictate judicial analysis of statutory language.22
So which characterization of Chevron is correct? And does the question
even matter?
Depending on the case and the context, Chevron may well fit into any or
even all of the above-described categories. These categories—rule of decision,
standard of review, and canon of statutory interpretation or construction—are
not necessarily mutually exclusive.23 The labels sometimes mean different
things to different people, so the contours of each category are hard to define.
Even as defined, the boundaries of each category are fuzzy and may overlap.
Still, at least as described by this article, each category represents a distinct
doctrinal concept that carries its own set of first principles. Those principles can

In re Gutierrez Brizuela, 2018 WL 1756899 (2018); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? 315–16 (2014); cf. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing a trend of “reflexive deference” in the circuit courts).
18 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298,
1348–49 (2018) (synthesizing the results of interviews with circuit court judges, some of
whom felt forced to follow Chevron despite their skepticism of its approach).
19 See infra Part II.A.
20 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (comparing a
standard of review to a “mood”); see also infra Part II.B.
21 See infra Part II.C.
22 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
(instructing reviewing courts to ascertain congressional intent at Chevron step one using
“traditional tools of statutory construction”).
23 Maureen Callahan has suggested additionally that Chevron could be a “rule of
abstention in favor of another governmental decisionmaker” in a manner akin to “prudential
limitations on justiciability in the federal courts.” Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts
Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289. Although interesting,
Callahan’s characterization has not gained the same traction as the three discussed in this
article, so we will leave considering it for another day.
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provide a theoretical starting point when confronting certain questions about the
Chevron doctrine.
Also, in many cases, how we categorize the Chevron doctrine may not
matter very much. Courts often find agency statutory interpretations clearly
“right” or clearly “wrong” at Chevron step one,24 or they otherwise signal that
they would either uphold or reject the agency’s interpretation irrespective of
Chevron.25
In certain instances, however, how we characterize Chevron could matter a
lot. Two prominent (and, at present, hotly debated) examples come readily to
mind.
The first is an emerging issue that is dividing circuit court judges and has
attracted the attention of Justice Gorsuch as well: whether the government can
waive or forfeit Chevron deference.26 Some judges conceive of Chevron as the
sort of legal argument that agencies must raise and even argue at some length in
order to preserve, and an agency’s failure to do so in briefing obviates the court’s
need to consider the Chevron doctrine at all.27 But some legal doctrines and

24 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (deciding against the

agency at step one); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 566 U.S. 93, 113 n.12 (2012) (deciding in
favor of the agency at step one); see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in
the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–34 (2017) (finding that federal circuit courts
resolved 30% of Chevron applications from 2003 through 2013 at Chevron step one).
25 See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) (rejecting deference
because the agency’s interpretation “makes scant sense”); Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc.
v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 544–45 (2008) (concluding that agency’s
interpretation was right without addressing belated claim to Chevron deference); WildEarth
Guardians v. U.S. EPA, 728 F.3d 1075, 1082 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding the agency’s
interpretation “persuasive” regardless of the standard applied).
26 See Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789,
790 (2020) (mem.) (statement of Gorsuch, J.) (“This Court has often declined to apply
Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.”); Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (recognizing active circuit split over
whether Chevron deference can be waived); see also infra Part III.A.
27 See, e.g., Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding
that an agency had “forfeited any claims to Chevron deference” by making only a “nominal[]
reference[]” to Chevron in its brief); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512
F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he [agency] waived any reliance on Chevron deference
by failing to raise it to the district court.”); see also Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 998
(10th Cir. 2020) (Carson, J., dissenting) (objecting to the application of Chevron when the
government disavowed reliance on it). See generally Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment,
Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927 (2018) (discussing the prospect that agencies can
waive Chevron deference by not affirmatively raising it or by intentionally abandoning it).
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arguments—like standards of review28 and canons of statutory
interpretation29—cannot be waived or forfeited. So what is Chevron?
The second question is more fundamental: should the Court overturn
Chevron? Some of Chevron’s critics have called for Chevron to be overruled,30
and several Supreme Court Justices seem amenable to the notion.31 Whether the
Court overturns Chevron could depend at least in part on its perception of how
principles of stare decisis might apply. In turn, how stare decisis applies may
depend upon how one categorizes Chevron.32
Our goal with this article is to explore these alternative characterizations of
the Chevron doctrine, and some of the implications of each. We ultimately
propose that, when it matters, Chevron is best understood as a standard of
review. We acknowledge the limitations of our framing and we do not ignore or
deny that some aspects and judicial applications of Chevron make the doctrine
seem in some instances more like a rule of decision or a canon of interpretation.
But we do suggest that framing Chevron as a standard of review should affect
how one perceives its characteristics. And we argue that Chevron is an evolving

28 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citing several circuits for “parties ‘cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to
argue it’”) (citation omitted); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 257 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing
decisions from several circuits for the proposition that “[a] party cannot waive, concede, or
abandon the applicable standard of review”), abrogated on other grounds by Ayestas v.
Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018).
29 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d
1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We, for example, would give no mind to a litigant’s
failure to invoke canons such as expressio unius or constitutional avoidance even if she
intentionally left them out of her brief.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.); cf.
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by
the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper
construction of governing law.”).
30 See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (2010);
Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and
Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1300–01, 1328–29 (2015); Richard W.
Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 69
ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017).
31 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring),
vacated, In re Gutierrez Brizuela, No. AXXX XX3 099, 2018 WL 1756899 (B.I.A. Jan. 4,
2018); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part) (contending that the Supreme Court’s decision not to overturn Auer deference does not
preclude reconsideration of Chevron); Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts, with Justice Alito joining).
32 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1765
(2010) (“[T]he Court does not give stare decisis to any statements of statutory interpretation
methodology.”) (footnote omitted); see also infra Part III.B.
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judicial construction of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 706(2)(A)
arbitrary and capricious standard, which is unquestionably a standard of review.
This article proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes the parameters of our
categories and how Chevron’s characteristics make it resemble alternatively a
rule of decision, a canon of construction, and a standard of review. Part III
considers why categorizing Chevron may be helpful in evaluating the
contemporary issues of whether Chevron can be waived or forfeited and whether
Chevron should be overturned. Part IV makes the case that Chevron is best
understood primarily as a standard of review.

II. CATEGORICAL ALTERNATIVES
Categorizing Chevron first requires defining the parameters and
characteristics of the alternatives: rule of decision, standard of review, and
canon of construction. The task is complicated by the fact that the categories
themselves are flexible in their meaning. At first blush, the labels sometimes
conjure up different ideas for different people, some of which are overlapping
or simply muddle the categories with one another. This difficulty does not
render the categories meaningless. As described below, all three are well
understood in contemporary jurisprudence and academic literature. Still, to
avoid confusion, some explication of the categories is necessary, along with
explanation of how Chevron would appear to fall within each.

A. Rule of Decision
In our system of judicial review and its resolution of disputes, some
questions are primary, conclusively determining legal rights and obligations or
the legal consequences of past or future behavior. Other questions are
secondary. They contribute to the process of judicial decisionmaking. They
require their own doctrinal analysis. Their resolution may even be outcome
determinative in a particular case. But they are not really what brought litigants
to court in the first instance.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “rule of decision” as “[a] rule, statute,
body of law, or prior decision that provides the basis for deciding or adjudicating
a case.”33 The definition’s allusion to the resolution of case outcomes suggests
that it is limited to those primary questions that determine legal rights,
obligations, or consequences.
To be clear, a rule of decision need not be a bright line. The legal principles
that courts apply to resolve disputes fall along a continuum of rules and

33 Rule of Decision, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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standards.34 The three-part balancing test adopted by Mathews v. Eldridge35 for
evaluating whether an agency’s hearing procedures satisfy the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is no less a rule of decision for being a classic
standard rather than a bright-line rule.36 Likewise, the logical outgrowth test for
evaluating the adequacy of a notice of proposed rulemaking under APA § 553,
which requires a court to decide “if interested parties should have anticipated
[from the notice] that the change [between the proposed and final rules] was
possible” is a standard.37
Correspondingly, the fact that rules of decision often take the form of
standards rather than bright-line rules means that courts and scholars will
sometimes refer to them as standards of review, in the sense that they are
standards that govern judicial decisionmaking. A key example comes from the
doctrines for evaluating Equal Protection Clause claims, which are styled in
terms of strict, intermediate, and rational basis scrutiny and represent the only
real effort to operationalize that constitutional text.38
Irrespective of whether they take the form of rules or standards, however,
all of the above-described doctrines are judge-made from whole cloth—
construing and operationalizing, respectively, constitutional and statutory text
that does not mention their terms.39 The key point is that, through applying those
standards, and other decision rules like them, courts resolve complaints that
government agencies have acted outside the boundaries of the law. And, in turn,
34 For just a few examples of the voluminous literature on rules and standards in law,
see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
35 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (evaluating the constitutionality
of agency hearing procedures by weighing (1) “the private interest that will be affected by
the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail”).
36 The constitutional theory literature sometimes speaks of the Supreme Court’s
development of these standards in terms of metadoctrine or construction versus
interpretation. See generally, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90
VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Solum, supra note 2.
37 Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010)
(describing the logical outgrowth test for determining compliance with APA § 553(b) and
(c)); see, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (same); Miami-Dade Cty. v. U.S. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1058–59 (11th Cir. 2008)
(same).
38 See, e.g., Cain Norris & Whitney Turk, Equal Protection, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & LAW
397, 400–07 (2013) (describing the tiers of equal protection analysis).
39 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 36, at 64–78 (describing judge-made operational rules).
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these decision rules guide the primary behavior of government actors. It is for
this reason that all of these doctrines represent rules of decision.
In the realm of statutory interpretation, as the Black’s Law definition
suggests, the statute itself at least theoretically provides the basis for resolving
legal rights, obligations, and consequences. Yet, statutes frequently fail at first
glance to answer statutory questions.40 Courts routinely bring to bear different
interpretive methods, tools, and—yes—deference doctrines to help them glean
congressional intent and resolve questions of statutory meaning.41 Those
methods, tools, and doctrines are not specific to any one interpretive question or
statute, but rather are generally applicable across a wide range of statutes and
subject matters.42 Consequently, in the statutory interpretation context, it may
be more accurate to say that whether a particular doctrine speaks to primary as
opposed to secondary decisionmaking—that is, whether a doctrine is a rule of
decision—depends upon whether that doctrine is itself binding, conclusive, and
outcome determinative.
Chevron has several features that could support its categorization as a rule
of decision in this vein. Courts and commentators frequently use mandatory
rhetoric to describe Chevron.43 Some opinions of the Supreme Court and of
individual Justices present and apply Chevron in a manner that allows the
doctrine to be cast as relatively rote in its application and predictable in its
outcomes.44 Finally, empirical work has shown that lower court judges feel
bound in their decisionmaking by Chevron,45 in a manner reminiscent of a rule
of decision.

40 Cf. Robert A. Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging

Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 388 (2016) (observing that judges can disagree over
“how to proceed when, as is often the case, the statute defies easy comprehension, when
something less than clarity reigns”).
41 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71–76 (2006) (comparing textualism and purposivism as interpretive
methods); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 80–89 (2018) (describing textual and substantive canons and their justifications,
including by reference to legislative supremacy and congressional preference); see also
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (justifying
deference as a means of honoring Congress’s delegation of authority to agencies).
42 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (explaining that interpretive regimes and
canons of construction can function as “off-the-rack” tools when interpreting ambiguous
statutes).
43 See infra Part II.A.1.
44 See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537–
41 (2014).
45 Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1348–49.
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1. Chevron’s Mandatory Rhetoric
Mandatory language pervades both courts’ analyses and scholarly
discussions surrounding Chevron. Justice Stevens’ opinion in Chevron itself
used mandatory language, declaring that a court “may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”46 The Supreme Court often has counseled that,
once a reviewing court establishes that Chevron applies and that the underlying
statute is ambiguous regarding the statutory question presented, the court “must
defer” to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.47 Other cases use
different rhetorical formulations, with words like “required”48 or “obligated,”49
but the implication is the same.
Such rhetoric may undermine the notion that Chevron is merely a
framework or tool for evaluating and discerning congressional intent and
statutory meaning. Instead, mandatory terms like “shall,” “must,” and “may not”
draw the attention of reviewing courts toward the end result, which in turn may
diminish the importance of robust and independent judicial analysis in favor of
more pro forma findings of ambiguity.50 Such a supposed potential effect on
judicial psychology is of course speculative, but it seems to play out in some
real cases.
In Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court was
confronted with whether new regulations were “more restrictive than” previous
regulations for evaluating claims to black lung benefits, and thus contrary to

46 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016)

(emphasis added) (“[A]t the second step the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation
if it is ‘reasonable.’”) (subsequent history omitted); Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134
S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (“[I]f the law does not speak clearly to the question at issue, a court
must defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation, rather than substitute its own reading.”);
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (“[W]hen the statute ‘is silent or ambiguous’
we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation.”);
see also Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1345 (describing Chevron as the “interpretive
rule that courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes”).
48 Beth Rochel Seminary v. Bennett, 825 F.2d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[W]e are
required to defer to the Department’s permissible construction of the Act.”).
49 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2122 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder
Chevron we are obligated to defer to a Government agency’s interpretation of the statute that
it administers so long as that interpretation is a permissible one.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50 See, e.g., id. at 2120–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (accusing circuit courts of a “type
of reflexive deference” with only “cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying the
ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be discerned, and whether
the [agency’s] interpretation was reasonable”) (internal citation omitted); E. Garrett West, A
Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 660–61 (2018)
(identifying Chevron as a standard of review but claiming that Chevron provides a “rule of
decision for situations when the statute yields no clear answer”).
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statutory requirements.51 After summarizing the case background and circuit
court disagreement,52 Justice Blackmun did not employ any of the traditional
tools for evaluating statutory meaning but rather launched directly into a
summary of the statute’s “complex and highly technical regulatory program,”
the agency’s expertise, and the Court’s deferential posture.53 He acknowledged
that the challengers’ “parsing of these impenetrable regulations would be
consistent with accepted canons of construction,” but maintained “that the
Secretary’s interpretation need not be the best or most natural one by
grammatical or other standards.”54 He even called it “axiomatic” that “the
Secretary’s view need be only reasonable to warrant deference.”55
In the face of precedents like this one, it is hardly surprising that lower
courts absorbed a message that Chevron demanded them to subordinate their
judgment to that of agencies. In a recent survey by Judge Richard Posner and
Abbe Gluck, a majority of federal appellate judges reported that they had
deferred under Chevron when they did not want to do so.56 As one judge
responded, “I apply [Chevron] because I don’t see any way out of it.”57
Even when the Court evaluates the statute for itself and rejects the agency’s
interpretation, it often couches its refusal to defer in terms that make Chevron
as a doctrine seem like a rejected alternative—notwithstanding the doctrine’s
specific inclusion of judicial analysis of statutory clarity at Chevron step one.
For example, in Pereira v. Sessions, the Court considered whether a document
that fails to specify the time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings can
be a “notice to appear” under the relevant statutory provision.58 Concluding that
such a document would not meet the statutory requirements, the Court noted
that it “need not resort to Chevron deference,” suggesting that the Court’s
interpretive result precluded application of a Chevron “rule.”59 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira noted discomfort with that possibility,
accusing the lower courts of conducting only a “cursory analysis” of Chevron’s
two steps.60 Suggesting that Chevron is an alternative to independent judicial
analysis, as opposed to incorporating independent judicial analysis, fosters the
perception that Chevron is a rule of decision the Court need not always address,
rather than a framework or tool that guides judicial review without dictating a
particular outcome.

51 See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 695 (1991).
52 Id. at 690–92.
53 Id. at 695–97.
54 Id. at 702.
55 Id.
56 Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1348–49.
57 Id. at 1349.
58 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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2. “Decision Tree” Applications
As noted, rules of decision can be flexible standards rather than bright
lines.61 Nevertheless, the more a doctrine seems to operate like a bright line rule,
the more conclusive and outcome determinative it may seem. Chevron has often
been characterized as more rule-like than other doctrines governing judicial
review.62 The Court’s mandatory rhetoric, as well as the routine portrayal of
Chevron in terms of steps, make Chevron susceptible to that characterization.63
Complementing Chevron’s mandatory rhetoric, many judicial opinions
seem to approach Chevron analysis in the manner of a “decision tree” that
magnifies the impression of Chevron as rule-like, binding, and outcome
determinative.64 Chevron is well known for its two steps. Again, the first asks
whether the meaning of the statute is clear, for if it is, then “that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”65 If the statute is ambiguous,
however, then Chevron instructs the reviewing court to ask whether the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible or reasonable.66 As the Court
articulated in United States v. Mead Corp., Chevron only applies when Congress
has delegated to the interpreting agency the authority to act with the force of law
and the agency, in articulating its interpretation, intended to exercise such
delegated power.67
In theory, one thus can cast Mead and Chevron as requiring a sequence of
separate, and relatively mechanical, “yes or no” inquiries:
1. Did Congress give the agency the authority to bind regulated parties
with the force and effect of law?68 If so,
2. Did the agency exercise that authority when it adopted the
interpretation at issue?69 If so,
61 See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text (describing generally the rule of
decision category).
62 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 808 (2002) (characterizing Chevron as “more
rule-like” than “the more standard-like Skidmore” doctrine); Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1735, 1813 (2010)
(describing Chevron as “formalist” and “rule-like” in contrast to the Skidmore standard).
63 See Merrill, supra note 62, at 809–10 (concluding that Chevron’s steps make it seem
rule-like because each step is “defined in terms of the examination of a single variable”).
64 See Hickman, supra note 44, at 537–41 (describing the decision tree approach to
Chevron review).
65 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
66 Id. at 843–44.
67 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
68 See Hickman, supra note 44, at 539 (reflecting this decision tree model of Mead and
Chevron pictorially).
69 Id.
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3. Is the statute ambiguous?70 If so,
4. Is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible construction
of the statute? If so, defer.71
Each of these inquiries may be open-ended and flexible. Judges and
administrative law scholars debate endlessly, for example, what it means for
agency action to carry the force of law,72 how clear is clear enough for
Chevron’s first step,73 and which tools to take into account in evaluating
clarity.74 Each step thus represents both a range of possible considerations and
an avenue for potential judicial disagreement. But the mere fact that Chevron
can be reduced to such a seemingly-mechanical framework gives it a strong
whiff of blunt predictability and conclusiveness.

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Compare, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 58–61 (2d Cir.

2004) (concluding that a HUD policy statement was eligible for Chevron deference), with
Krzalic v. Republic Tile Co., 314 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (reaching the opposite
conclusion). For further discussion, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459–64 (2005) (describing
inconsistent approaches to the force of law inquiry in the circuit courts); Kristin E. Hickman,
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 510–25 (2013) (documenting debates
and disagreements over the force of law issue); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference,
Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1016–17 (2005) (arguing
that an agency action should only carry the force of law if “the agency commits to applying
it uniformly across time and parties”).
73 Compare, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002)
(concluding that a statute was ambiguous because it was “silent” on the question before the
Court and “d[id] not foreclose” the agency’s approach), with FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–43 (2000) (analyzing statutory structure and purpose as
well as history of congressional action and inaction at length in finding the statute “clear”),
and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–31 (1994)
(concluding that an agency’s interpretation went “beyond the meaning that the statute [could]
bear” by analyzing dictionary definitions as well as the structure and purpose of the statutory
scheme). For further discussion, see Scalia, supra note 9, at 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It
is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency
interpretations of law will be fought.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2091 (1990) (“Chevron does not say how ambiguous a
statute must be in order for the agency view to control.”).
74 Compare, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2015)
(considering legislative history at Chevron step one), and BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States,
775 F.3d 743, 755 & n.87 (5th Cir. 2015) (same), with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288,
292 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.”).
For further analysis, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 76–84 (2008) (discussing competing
judicial approaches to the relationship between Chevron and substantive canons).
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Several Supreme Court opinions exemplify the decision tree approach to
Chevron analysis.75 In Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, for example,
the Court considered a Federal Reserve Board regulation promulgated under the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA).76 In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the
Court first concluded that the agency had authority—via an express statutory
delegation—to issue binding regulations interpreting TILA, which authority the
agency obviously exercised by promulgating the regulation under challenge.77
The Court then proceeded to Chevron’s two steps. After examining TILA’s text
and structure, the Court found the statute ambiguous.78 The Court then
proceeded to Chevron’s second step, examining the agency’s reasoning for its
choice and finding the agency’s interpretation reasonable.79
On at least some of the occasions when its analysis has followed this rather
mechanical approach to Chevron analysis, the Court has seemed quick—
perhaps too quick—to conclude that a statutory provision is ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. In Yellow Transportation, Inc. v.
Michigan, for example, the Court offered shockingly little analysis in deferring
to the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute.80 The Court mentioned
none of the usual tools of statutory interpretation, such as linguistic canons,
dictionaries, or legislative history, in dispensing with Chevron’s first step,
observing only that the provision at issue “d[id] not foreclose” the agency’s
interpretation.81 The Court acknowledged the existence of multiple alternative
readings of the provision, but again with seemingly little inquiry, the Court
simply concluded that the agency’s choice was reasonable and deference was
appropriate.82 To the extent the Court’s analysis follows this model and offers
what appears to be a relatively pro forma analysis of the statute and agency
reasoning,83 Chevron looks more like a rule of decision than a deferential
standard.

75 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53,
58 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517, 521 (2009) (Kennedy, J.);
United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316–17, 319–20 (2009) (Souter, J.); Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (Thomas, J.);
Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002) (O’Connor, J.).
76 Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 235 (2004).
77 Id. at 238.
78 Id. at 241–42.
79 Id. at 242–43.
80 Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002).
81 See id. at 45.
82 Id. at 45–46.
83 Of course, a judicial opinion may not fully articulate the entirety of a Justice’s
decisionmaking process. A Justice might review statutory text, history, and purpose
extensively in a search for clarity yet decide, for whatever reason, that detailing that analysis
in full in the text of her opinion would be unnecessary or excessive. If one takes that
possibility seriously, then perhaps it is unwise to focus too much on the reasoning a Justice
offers (or fails to offer) to support her holding in a given case. Cf. Peter M. Tiersma, The
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3. Chevron’s Cumulative Effect
If Chevron is a rule of decision, one might expect to be able to discern
empirically that it actually alters case outcomes. A number of studies have
explored Chevron’s effect on agency affirmance rates, with mixed results.
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer, analyzing 1,014 Supreme Court
opinions evaluating agency statutory interpretations between 1983 and 2005,
found that the Court affirmed agency interpretations 76.2% of the time under
Chevron84—more often than either de novo review or the multifactor Skidmore
standard, but less often than the Curtiss-Wright doctrine, which is sometimes
described as a canon of construction.85 Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein
analyzed a smaller set—sixty-nine Supreme Court opinions between 1989 and
2005 in which the Court explicitly invoked Chevron—and found an affirmance
rate of 67%.86 On the other hand, Miles and Sunstein also documented a high
degree of variability among the individual Justices, ranging from high rates of
deference under Chevron for Justice Breyer at 81.8% and Justice Souter at 77%
down to Justice Scalia at 53.6% and Justice Thomas at 52.2%,87 which suggests
that perhaps Chevron is not quite so rigid as its rule-like characterization might
suggest. In two studies of studies predating 2010, David Zaring and Richard
Pierce concluded separately that Chevron did not meaningfully change case
outcomes.88
Turning to the circuit courts, evaluating cases from 1995 and 1996, Orin
Kerr found that agencies won 73% of Chevron cases in circuit courts.89 By
comparison, with Matthew Krueger, one of us (Hickman) examined 106 cases
Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1248–57 (2007) (describing the
“textualization” of judicial opinion writing).
84 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1094, 1099, 1142 tbl.15 (2008); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984,
1007–09 (finding an affirmance rate of 76.7% under Chevron).
85 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1142; Abbe R. Gluck, Justice
Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism
Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2062 (2017) (suggesting that “most legislation
scholars” see Curtiss-Wright as well as Chevron as canons of construction); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1309–10 (1988) (“Executive branch attorneys have read
[Curtiss-Wright] as defining a canon of deferential statutory construction for courts
construing foreign affairs statutes.”).
86 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 849 (2006).
87 Id. at 831.
88 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L.
REV. 135, 137, 171 (2010).
89 Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998).
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applying Skidmore deference from 2001 through 2005 and found an affirmance
rate of 60.4%.90 Christopher Walker and Kent Barnett’s more recent and
comprehensive study found an affirmance rate of 77.4% when the circuit courts
applied Chevron, compared to 38.5% when the circuit courts applied de novo
review.91 But the de novo cases in Walker and Barnett’s dataset only included
those cases in which a court had expressly mentioned Chevron and then decided
to apply de novo review.92 In other words, Walker and Barnett did not account
for cases in which a court resolved the interpretive question de novo—whether
for or against the agency—without mentioning Chevron.93 One might expect
that a court that mentioned and declined to apply Chevron might be predisposed
to reject the agency’s interpretation. Still, these results led Walker and Barnett
to conclude that “agency interpretations were significantly more likely to prevail
under Chevron deference.”94
While attempts to quantify Chevron’s impact provide useful food for
thought, their utility in evaluating Chevron’s categorization may be limited.
Even empirical studies finding a significant Chevron impact signal at most a
correlative relationship between Chevron and case outcomes. The boundaries
necessarily erected when creating data sets, defining variables, and placing
cases into a limited number of coded categories make any definitive statement
of causation elusive. In other words, the studies do not capture the nuances of
why courts might affirm agencies more often under Chevron. Courts applying
Chevron may believe that doctrine dictates a particular conclusion. But it is
equally plausible that the conditions leading courts to apply Chevron in the first
instance, such as the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking or the agency’s
comparative expertise, yield superior agency interpretations that courts simply
find more persuasive. No controlled study can meaningfully account for the
wide range of factors that influence whether a court chooses to apply Chevron
in a given case—not to mention the significant variation among courts and
individual judges in what it means to apply Chevron.95 Whatever Chevron’s
impact on affirmance rates, it is safe to say that whether or to what extent
Chevron drives case outcomes is unsettled.

90 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore

Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007).
91 Barnett & Walker, supra note 24, at 30.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 6. But see Mark J. Richards, Joseph L. Smith, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Does
Chevron Matter?, 28 L. & POL’Y 444, 464 (2006) (observing increased deference by the
Supreme Court in the years following Chevron but also contending “that justices are
influenced significantly, perhaps even primarily, by [the interaction of the justices’ attitudes
with the policy direction of the agency decision]”).
95 Cf. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895,
1905–07 (2009).
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B. Standard of Review
Chevron is frequently described as a standard of review.96 Courts and
parties routinely recite the Chevron standard in the “standard of review” sections
of judicial opinions97 and briefs98 when a litigant claims that an agency has
misinterpreted a statute. Many proposals for eliminating Chevron purport to
replace the doctrine with de novo review,99 which certainly is a standard of
review.100
In litigation, a standard of review is a “criterion by which the decision of a
lower tribunal will be measured by a higher tribunal to determine its correctness
or propriety.”101 In the Article III context, standards of review carry labels like
de novo, clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion, and plain error.102 These labels
represent “the degree of scrutiny with which federal appellate courts examine

96 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58
(2011) (describing a situation in which “Chevron provided the appropriate standard of
review”); NASDAQ Stock Mkt., LLC v. SEC, 961 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(describing Chevron as part of determining what standard of review governs the statutory
interpretation question at bar); Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1244
(10th Cir. 2020) (“When reviewing an agency’s legal determination, the court generally
applies the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron[.]”) (subsequent
history omitted); Perez Perez v. Wolf, 943 F.3d 853, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2019) (instructing the
district court to decide “the standard of review to apply on remand, including whether
Chevron or Auer deference is appropriate”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899
F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (identifying Chevron as a standard of review); Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 508 (2d Cir. 2017)
(holding that an agency rule “satisfies Chevron’s deferential standard of review”); see also
HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 136 (3d ed. 2018) (listing Chevron’s two
steps among the standards of review for agency actions).
97 See, e.g., Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Hulu, LLC., 966 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 955 F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir.
2020); Amezcua-Preciado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2019); Tilija
v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 930 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2019); Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606, 612
(2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1022, 2020 WL 3492659 (2020).
98 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 27, Mass. Dep’t of Telecomms. & Cable v. FCC,
No. 19-2282 (1st Cir. July 15, 2020), 2020 WL 4435348, at *27; Petitioner’s Opening Brief
at 33–36, Bahr v. Wheeler, No. 20-70092 (9th Cir. May 29, 2020), 2020 WL 3002214, at
*33–36; Response Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 16–18, Leiva v. Admin. Review Bd.,
No. 19-60524 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2019), 2019 WL 5784846, at *16–18; Brief for Respondent
Federal Labor Relations Authority at 24, Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, No. 191111 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2019), 2019 WL 5683912, at *24.
99 See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong.
§ 2(3) (2016).
100 See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3.
101 Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 11, 15 (1994) (emphasis removed).
102 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3.
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decisions emanating from district courts”103 or, in other words, “the degree to
which circuit courts will defer to the decisions of district judges.”104
Unlike rules of decision, standards of review do not dictate how courts
should decide disputed questions of legal rights, obligations, or
consequences.105 Instead, they are attitudinal, offering relative conceptions
regarding just “how wrong” a lower tribunal must be to warrant reversal.106 To
the extent that they call upon appellate judges to give way to the decisions of
trial judges, however, these standards reflect “legislative and common-law
allocations of decisional authority between” the two.107 In addition, standards
of review “describe the relevant and appropriate materials the appellate court
looks to in performing its review function”—e.g., whether the reviewer should
consider the whole record.108
In the administrative law context, courts review the decisions and actions of
government agencies rather than those of lower courts. The APA109 and certain
organic statutes110 add the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial
evidence standard to the lexicon, for example.111 Regardless, the basic concept
is the same. These standards represent “the kind of scrutiny which a [c]ourt of
[a]ppeals must give,”112 or “how closely the federal courts may scrutinize
agency decisionmaking.”113

1. Strength in Indeterminacy
Standards of review are usually “easier to describe than to define.”114
Ultimately, labels like “abuse of discretion,” “clearly erroneous,” “substantial
evidence,” and “arbitrary and capricious” say little about how a court will

103 Id.
104 Id. at 4–5; see also 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL

STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-4 (4th ed. 2010) (describing standards of review
similarly in terms of scrutiny and deference).
105 See discussion supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (describing rules of
decision in these terms).
106 Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 235 (2009).
107 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 3.
108 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 104, § 1.01, at 1-3.
109 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
110 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012); 30 U.S.C.
§ 816(a)(1) (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (2012).
111 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 136. Edwards and Elliot add the Chevron
doctrine to the list of administrative law standards of review. Id. But as this Article
demonstrates, that categorization is not universal.
112 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
113 EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 96, at 136.
114 Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L.
REV. 231, 232 (1991).
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proceed to apply the standards those labels represent.115 Hence, standards of
review often come with a deceptively uniform boilerplate of “talismanic” words
that courts faithfully recite (and purport to apply), giving the false appearance
of uniformity across cases.116 The boilerplate is an important first step of
communicating the degree of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply, and it can
help both the court and the litigants structure and frame their legal arguments,
but it offers nothing remotely resembling bright lines to govern judicial
decisionmaking.117
The elusiveness of clear definitions or guidelines leads to considerable
variation and inconsistency in how courts apply standards of review. On the
other hand, that inconsistency, while the target of much criticism,118 may
actually contribute to the strength of a standard of review.119
Certainly this was the view of Justice Frankfurter in the Universal Camera
case.120 That decision involved the parameters of the substantial evidence
standard for judicial review of agency factual findings, rather than Chevron.121
Regardless, courts frequently cite Justice Frankfurter’s description of the
substantial evidence standard as requiring “more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”122 Justice Frankfurter recognized that the inherent indeterminacy
of such language led to “inevitably variant applications” that “in due course bred
criticism.”123 But far from eschewing that indeterminacy, Justice Frankfurter
embraced it. He described standards of review as “mood[s]” that “can only serve
as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of

115 See, e.g., CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 104, § 1.01, at 1–2 (describing standards
of review as “yardstick phrases” that “are not self-actualizing”).
116 See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 101, at 12 (suggesting that courts invoke standards of
review “talismanically” and “to create an illusion of harmony between the appropriate result
and the applicable law”).
117 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 106, at 248–49 (explaining how ambiguity “gives a judge
only a vague understanding of the boundaries each standard of review imposes”).
118 See, e.g., Todd J. Bruno, Say What?? Confusion in the Courts Over What Is the
Proper Standard of Review for Hearsay Rulings, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 17
(2013) (complaining that “standards of review are anything but self-defining and selfapplying” and that they “propagate[] judicial confusion”); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra
Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004) (suggesting that courts
“employ[] standards of review as substitutes for analysis”).
119 See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 101, at 13 (“The main point is that standards of review
are and should be flexible.”).
120 See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
121 See generally id. For further consideration, see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
122 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). The case is also known for its holding that a reviewing court applying the
substantial evidence standard should consider the whole agency record rather than merely
cherry-picking the evidence that supports the agency’s view. Id. at 487–88.
123 Id. at 477.
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applications. Enforcement of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind and
solidity of judgment.”124 Continuing the thought, he offered,
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual
process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry.
It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate
reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence
and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon
its work. . . . There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of
judgment.125

2. Chevron’s Flexibility
At least at a superficial level, Chevron carries many of the trappings of a
standard of review. Courts and commentators frequently refer to it as a standard
of review.126 Courts and parties recite the Chevron standard in the “standard of
review” sections of briefs and judicial opinions.127 Many proposals for
eliminating Chevron involve replacing the doctrine with de novo review, which
is certainly a standard of review.128
Delving beneath that surface, like other standards of review, Chevron has a
deceptively uniform boilerplate statement with two steps focused first on
statutory clarity and second on reasonableness.129 In case after case, the
Supreme Court has introduced its application of Chevron in such terms, whether

124 Id. at 487; see also Demer v. IBM Corp. Ltd. Plan, 835 F.3d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 2016)
(Bybee, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s mood characterization); 3 STEVEN
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 15.01, at 15-1 to
15-2 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the same).
125 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488–89.
126 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58
(2011) (describing a situation in which “Chevron provided the appropriate standard of
review”); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 508
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an agency rule “satisfies Chevron’s deferential standard of
review”); Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also EDWARDS
& ELLIOTT, supra note 96, at 136 (listing Chevron’s two steps among the standards of review
for agency actions); Nicholas R. Bednar, The Clear-Statement Chevron Canon, 66 DEPAUL
L. REV. 819, 823 (2017); West, supra note 50, at 661.
127 See supra notes 97 & 98 (citing examples).
128 See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong.
§ 2(3) (2016).
129 See discussion supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and summarizing Chevron’s two steps).
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it ultimately deferred to the agency130 or not.131 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the
Court even described its recitation of Chevron’s two steps as “that case’s nowcanonical formulation.”132
In other work, one of us (Hickman) has argued that the Chevron label and
its two-step boilerplate represent a doctrine that is applied much more flexibly
to accommodate a variety of interpretive methods and tools.133 Judges will of
course disagree about what methods or tools are eligible for consideration at
step one or when a statutory term is ambiguous. Some have treated Chevron’s
first step as a threshold inquiry into whether the text of a statute entirely
forecloses a proposed meaning.134 Others conduct a more robust step one
inquiry that incorporates a comprehensive review of statutory text, purpose,
legislative history, and substantive canons.135 In the face of arguably
inconsistent Supreme Court precedent, the federal circuit courts are divided over
whether legislative history may be considered at step one or must be postponed
until step two.136 Many of these differences are attributable not to different
visions of Chevron but to different interpretive methodologies. The variation
persists into Chevron’s second step, where some judges have focused their
reasonableness inquiry on the statutory text, history, and purpose137 while others
have blended other factors into their analysis.138
130 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296, 307 (2013) (outlining and

analyzing the case according to Chevron’s two steps before deferring to the agency’s
interpretation); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665–66
(2007) (same); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–18, 222 (2002) (same); Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1992) (same).
131 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124–25 (2016)
(reciting Chevron’s two steps before declining to defer) (subsequent history omitted); FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 160 (2000) (same).
132 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296.
133 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1446 (2017).
134 See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (holding that a
statute is ambiguous because it “does not foreclose” the agency’s interpretation).
135 See Scalia, supra note 9, at 521 (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning
of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds
less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”).
136 Compare, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (listing
legislative history among the “traditional tools” to be considered at Chevron’s first step), and
BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 775 F.3d 743, 755 (5th Cir. 2015) (considering legislative
history as part of step one analysis), with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292–94 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.”), and
Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that “some of
our sister circuits consider legislative history at [Chevron step one], but we prefer to save
that inquiry for Chevron’s second step”) (citation omitted).
137 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 386–92 (1999).
138 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124–26 (2016) (declining
Chevron deference for agency inconsistency) (subsequent history omitted); Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (blending Chevron and State Farm reasoned
decisionmaking analysis).
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Courts and scholars have advanced several competing versions of what
Chevron requires.139 The decision tree model derived from multiple Supreme
Court decisions and described above is one example.140 By comparison, Justice
Breyer favors a much looser approach to Chevron that blends its assumptions
about congressional delegations of interpretive power141 and statutory text,
history, and purpose with a variety of other factors.142 Academic commentators
have suggested that Chevron really only has one step,143 that the traditional two
steps should be reversed,144 or that State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking
analysis should be incorporated into Chevron step two.145
All of these variations of Chevron share a basic premise: that strong, though
not unquestioning, judicial deference is warranted for some subset of agency
statutory interpretations because of a legislative decision to confer some amount
of policymaking discretion on the agency tasked with implementing statutory
requirements.146 All of Chevron’s variations acknowledge the doctrine’s two
139 Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1418–42 (summarizing several competing
interpretations of Chevron advanced by legal scholars and in Supreme Court opinions).
140 See discussion supra notes 61–83 and accompanying text.
141 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(explaining Chevron deference by reference to express and implicit delegations from
Congress of authority to elucidate statutory meaning); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226–29 (2001) (premising Chevron deference on congressional delegations of
interpretive authority).
142 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–11 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part) (discussing and relying on different factors); Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002) (emphasizing the interpretation’s longevity and listing other
potentially relevant factors); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Chevron only added an additional factor of
congressional delegation to the traditional, multi-factor Skidmore analysis); see also
Hickman, supra note 44, at 541–42 (describing Justice Breyer’s approach as like a “word
cloud”).
143 See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 599.
144 Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 619 (2014).
145 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 10, at 1266–79; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73
TEX. L. REV. 83, 129–30 (1994).
146 The most common term for this premise is delegation. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533
U.S. at 226–27 (holding that eligibility for Chevron deference turns on a congressional
delegation of authority to act with the force of law). Justice Scalia objected to the delegation
terminology. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1005, 1014–20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239, 241–45 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). But Justice Scalia also acknowledged that “[a]n ambiguity in a statute
committed to agency implementation” sometimes means that “Congress . . . meant to leave
its resolution to the agency,” which many would find indistinguishable from delegation.
Scalia, supra note 9, at 516; see also Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1443
(elaborating this idea). Current debates over the constitutionality of such delegations are
beside the point. See generally, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). If a
delegation is unconstitutional, then Chevron deference obviously would be unavailable to
interpretations adopted pursuant to that delegation. Cf. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133,
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steps as its boilerplate description, even if from there they argue for more or
fewer steps in actual application.147 And all of Chevron’s variations accept its
call for judges to engage in some application of traditional tools of statutory
construction to evaluate statutory meaning.148
Beyond that, however, the many variations of Chevron diverge in
innumerable different directions. Yet none of the variations are demonstrably
incorrect, all are theoretically defensible, and all find support in opinions of the
Supreme Court.149 Chevron is capacious enough to accommodate them all.

C. Canon of Construction
A growing body of scholarship classifies Chevron itself as a “canon of
construction.”150 The phrase generally refers to a broad collection of linguistic
and substantive principles that judges might apply to resolve statutory
interpretation questions.151 Canons fall into subcategories that reflect the
differences in their origins and purposes. Semantic canons reflect widely held
understandings about grammar and usage and are based on the premise that
those common principles inform how one reads statutory text.152 Substantive
canons also help judges resolve statutory ambiguities, but reflect policy goals
and value judgments rather than shared understandings about language.153 Some
at 1453–56 (arguing that Chevron deference, or something like it, is inevitable so long as the
Court accepts congressional delegation of policymaking discretion).
147 See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 133, at 1418–42.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 417–18 (2016) (describing Chevron as an “extrinsic
source canon”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618–19 (1992)
(describing Chevron as a substantive canon); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2118 (listing
Chevron alongside constitutional avoidance and reliance on legislative history as methods
of resolving statutory ambiguity); Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1765–66
(concluding that the Supreme Court treats Chevron more like a canon than as binding
precedent); see also generally Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative
Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (2019) (comparing Chevron
to other “interpretive methodologies”).
151 Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 42, at 65–67.
152 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 924–25 (2013) (describing semantic canons); Christopher J. Walker,
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1022–23 (2015) (same); cf.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 51 (2012) (“Most of the canons of interpretation . . . are not ‘rules’ of interpretation
in any strict sense but presumptions about what an intelligently produced text conveys.”).
153 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L.
REV. 163, 179–81 (2018) (contrasting “language” (semantic) canons and substantive ones);
Walker, supra note 152, at 1031 (describing substantive canons); see also, e.g., Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 152, at 924 (same).
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scholars recognize a third category of “extrinsic canons” that concern when
judges might consult “outside sources”—extratextual material including but not
limited to legislative history.154
Canons typically consist of a trigger and response. For example, under the
well known ejusdem generis canon, the trigger typically is a list of covered items
accompanied by an ambiguous catchall term, and the response is to interpret that
catchall term to include only those things that are “like” the other items in the
list.155 For the rule of lenity, arguably much like Chevron, the trigger is
ambiguity in a criminal statute, and the response is to interpret that ambiguity
in the defendant’s favor.156
Some substantive canons are clear statement rules, requiring Congress to
signal its intentions clearly before the courts will apply the canon.157 But a
number of substantive canons are ambiguity tie breakers.158 And when the
application of a substantive canon turns on an amorphous finding like
“ambiguity,” the trigger may be somewhat difficult to establish.159 Regardless,
once a court has identified the trigger, a canon’s utility lies in its ease of
application.
A single canon rarely provides the sole basis for a judicial decision, and
canons usually appear in combination with one another in justifying an
154 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 152, at 924–25; Noah B. Lindell, The

Dignity Canon, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 431 (2017); Philip A. Talmadge, A New
Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 196–99
(2001).
155 See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384–85 (2003); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936);
cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543–46 (2015) (discussing and applying the ejusdem
generis canon along with the “similar” noscitur a sociis canon); Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 720–21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I
would call it noscitur a sociis, but the principle is much the same: The fact that several items
in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that
attribute as well”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446
U.S. 578, 587–89 (1980) (describing limitations of the ejusdem generis canon and declining
to apply it).
156 See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1990).
157 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 150, at 611–
12; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 121–
26 (2001).
158 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 117–19 (2010) (describing types of canons); Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked
Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 635, 665 (2008) (discussing
canons as ambiguity tie breakers).
159 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“The simple existence of
some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of [the rule of
lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2118
(“[J]udges often cannot make [the] initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled,
principled, or evenhanded way.”); see also Slocum, supra note 158, at 665 (describing tiebreaker canons as “[t]he weakest substantive canons”).
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interpretive result.160 Especially when a substantive canon serves as an
ambiguity tie breaker, courts usually exhaust other interpretive tools before
turning to the canon.161 Consequently, judges rarely consider themselves bound
to apply a particular canon, particularly when they can resolve the interpretive
question in some other way.162

1. Chevron as a Substantive Canon
Categorizing Chevron as a substantive canon of construction has a certain
intuitive appeal. Chevron is predicated on certain understandings and
assumptions regarding interbranch relationships and congressional intent as
conveyed through express and implied delegations to agencies of the authority
to act with the force and effect of law.163 Courts often employ it in conjunction
with other canons;164 indeed, the Chevron decision itself instructed courts to do
so.165 The Supreme Court thus has expressly styled Chevron with many of the
trappings of a substantive canon—instructing reviewing courts to apply other
interpretive tools to discern statutory meaning and congressional intent first, and
then in the face of ambiguity, telling them which side should win. Framing
Chevron as a substantive canon maintains much of the doctrine’s substance and
merely replaces the rhetoric of deference with that of ambiguity tie breakers,
clear statement rules, and presumptions.
To that end, legal scholars have offered competing articulations of Chevron
as a substantive canon. Cass Sunstein summarized it in one sentence: “In the
face of ambiguity, statutes mean what the relevant agency takes them to
mean.”166 He described Chevron as “the quintessential prodelegation canon,”
160 See Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1734–35.
161 See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (“The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing

everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended.”) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks and ellipses omitted); Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (“Instead, we have always
reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s
intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and
motivating policies of the statute.”) (internal quotations omitted).
162 See Gluck & Posner, supra note 18, at 1334 (reporting that most judges did not feel
bound to use particular canons).
163 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (expressly
basing Chevron deference on the agency’s delegated authority to act with the force of law);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44, 865–66 (1984).
164 See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–600 (2004);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 694, 697, 707–
08 (1995); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610–14 (1991); Humane Soc’y of U.S.
v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2010).
165 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
166 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329 (2000); see
also Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 618–19 (providing a substantially similar
framing of the Chevron canon: “Unless refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court
must defer to [an] agency interpretation”).
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noting that Chevron incorporates a presumption that ambiguity is a delegation
of interpretive power to agencies rather than to courts.167 Nicholas Bednar,
expanding on earlier work by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey,168 has
framed the Chevron canon more forcefully as a clear statement rule: “Unless
refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency
interpretation.”169 Like other substantive canons, Chevron creates a
presumption of congressional intent that arises in the face of textual silence or
ambiguity.170 The constitutional avoidance canon, for example, does something
similar in the case of an ambiguity that raises a serious constitutional
question.171
Substantive canons implement values.172 Viewing Chevron as a substantive
canon, one can reframe the doctrine’s traditional justifications as the values that
the Chevron canon promotes. The Court itself has justified Chevron in terms of
superior agency subject matter expertise and democratic legitimacy, in addition
to its presumption that Congress signals a preference for agencies to resolve
statutory gaps when it delegates policymaking authority to agencies.173 Cass
Sunstein has suggested also that Chevron is a statement about the allocation of
government power, “defin[ing] a cluster of ideas about who is entrusted with
interpreting ambiguous statutes.”174 As a canon of statutory construction,
Chevron transforms these animating principles into just another tool for
resolving statutory meaning.

2. The Chevron Canon in Practice
In practice, some Justices have approached Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of statutes as they would any other canon—i.e., as one of several
factors or elements supporting an interpretive result. Consistent with the notion
167 Sunstein, supra note 166, at 329.
168 Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 618–19.
169 Bednar, supra note 126, at 822.
170 West, supra note 50, at 658.
171 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (stating that, where multiple

plausible interpretations exist, the avoidance canon rests “on the reasonable presumption that
Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”).
172 See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 150, at 595 (describing substantive canons
as “clear statement rules or presumptions of statutory interpretation that reflect substantive
values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution”).
173 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–30 (2018) (emphasizing
democratic accountability as well as delegation as justifications for Chevron); Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Certain aspects of statutory
interpretation . . . are properly understood as delegated by Congress to an expert and
accountable administrative body.”); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting
that agency expertise counsels in favor of deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001) (describing Chevron as premised on a congressional delegation theory);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (justifying
Chevron on all three grounds).
174 Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, supra note 73, at 2075.
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that courts are not bound to preference one canon over another, the Court often
has applied Chevron “episodically and not entirely predictably.”175 Empirical
analysis by William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented the Court’s failure
to mention Chevron at all in a little more than half of the cases between 1984
and 2006 in which it might have done so.176
Subsequent research by Connor Raso and William Eskridge separately
identified several trends in Chevron’s application that they associated with
canons of construction.177 One was the Justices’ application of Chevron
“episodically and not entirely predictably,” which prompts them to characterize
Chevron as a “flexible rule[] of thumb or presumption[]” that a Justice may or
may not apply.178 Second, they note that individual Justices apply Chevron in
idiosyncratic ways based on “each Justice’s particular normative vision”179—
notably a characteristic we also associate with Chevron as a standard of
review.180 According to Raso and Eskridge, however, the Court’s frequent
failure to mention Chevron where it applies demonstrates that the Court does
not apply Chevron even when it appears applicable.181
To support their characterization, Raso and Eskridge offer the useful
example of Smith v. City of Jackson.182 In that case, the Justices divided over
how to approach an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
interpretation that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
permitted recovery for disparate impact claims.183 In an opinion for a plurality
of the Court, Justice Stevens analyzed the text and history of the ADEA to
conclude that disparate impact claims were permitted, but failed to mention
Chevron.184 The EEOC’s consistent interpretation provided further support for
the Court’s conclusion but appeared to have little to no bearing on the Court’s
analysis.185
Justice Breyer’s dissent in SAS Institute v. Iancu is a more recent
example.186 Citing Chevron’s two-step framework up front, Justice Breyer then
examined the statutory text, structure, and purposes—as well as the practical
implications of the majority’s holding—to conclude that the inter partes review
175 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1734, 1766.
176 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1089–90 (“[F]rom the time it was handed

down until the end of the 2005 term, Chevron was applied in only 8.3% of Supreme Court
cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations [and] in the majority of [those] cases–
53.6% of them–the Court does not apply any deference regime at all.”).
177 See generally Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62.
178 Id. at 1766.
179 Id.
180 See discussion supra notes 114–25 and accompanying text.
181 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1740 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 982–84 (1992)).
182 Id. at 1729 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)).
183 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
184 See generally id.
185 Id. at 239–40.
186 See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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statute was ambiguous as to whether the Patent Office could limit its review to
only certain challenged patent claims.187 Justice Breyer then returned to
Chevron:
In referring to Chevron, I do not mean that courts are to treat that case like
a rigid, black-letter rule of law, instructing them always to allow agencies
leeway to fill every gap in every statutory provision. Rather, I understand
Chevron as a rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that leeway
which Congress intended the agencies to have. I recognize that Congress does
not always consider such matters, but if not, courts can often implement a more
general, virtually omnipresent congressional purpose—namely, the creation of
a well-functioning statutory scheme—by using a canon-like, judicially created
construct, the hypothetical reasonable legislator, and asking what such
legislators would likely have intended had Congress considered the question
of delegating gap-filling authority to the agency.188

Applying this understanding, Justice Breyer concluded that the statute’s
complexity and “the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative
experience” counseled in favor of deference.189
Separately, in documenting Chevron’s effect on Congress, Abbe Gluck and
Lisa Schultz Bressman also have concluded that Chevron operates as a canon,
which they label as “deliberation-forcing.”190 According to Gluck and
Bressman, while Chevron does not necessarily reflect linguistic norms under
which both courts and Congress may operate, as is the case with some other
canons, Chevron nevertheless reminds statute drafters of the “consequences of
ambiguity.”191 Similarly, Chevron may create expectations in drafters of both
statutes and regulations for how a court will resolve interpretive questions in the
face of ambiguity and delegation of policymaking power.192 The more those
expectations are tested and confirmed through the iterative process of drafting
and judicial review, the more they will become reliable predictors of statutory
and regulatory meaning.

III. WHY DO WE CARE?
Most cases in which courts contemplate Chevron can be resolved without
digging too deeply into the doctrine’s nuances. In many cases, the reviewing
187 Id. at 1360–64.
188 Id. at 1364 (citation omitted).
189 Id. at 1364–65 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)).
190 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 152, at 996.
191 Id.
192 See id.; Walker, supra note 152, at 1007 (reporting that agency regulation drafters

are “well aware of the Chevron deference standard”); cf. United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 503 (2012) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our legal system
presumes there will be continuing dialogue among the three branches of Government on
questions of statutory interpretation and application.”).
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court decides that Chevron obviously does not apply because the agency action
in question obviously lacks the force of law so is ineligible for Chevron
deference on that basis.193 In other cases, the Court simply decides the meaning
of the statute is clear, signaling that the outcome would be the same with or
without Chevron, and thereby avoiding any question of deference.194 With some
regularity, courts volunteer that they would resolve the case one way or the other
irrespective of deference doctrine and without deciding whether Chevron or any
other such doctrine might otherwise apply.195 In all such cases, how one
categorizes Chevron is probably irrelevant.
Sometimes, however, disagreements over how to think about the Chevron
doctrine cannot be avoided. In such cases, courts need more of a theoretical
framework for thinking about Chevron’s nuances. In recent years, two such
issues have become particularly salient. One is an emerging disagreement
among the circuit courts over whether or under what circumstances the
government can waive or forfeit its eligibility for Chevron deference. The other
is the substantially more fundamental question whether the Supreme Court
should overrule Chevron altogether as incompatible with and an abdication of
the judiciary’s constitutional role.

A. Waiving Chevron
In our adversarial judicial system, failing to make certain arguments—to
assert rights or privileges—on a timely basis may prevent a litigant from
obtaining judicial review of those arguments at all.196 Not every argument can

193 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88 (2004); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 234 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
194 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana
v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034,
2040 (2012); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002).
195 See Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2040; Indian River Cty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 945
F.3d 515, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1304, 2020 WL 5882262 (2020);
Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2014); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res.
& Env’t Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 284 n.25 (3d Cir. 2012); see
also Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 285, 335 n.302
(2014) (“Put differently, when the statute’s meaning is clear, the choice among Chevron,
Skidmore, or some other standard is moot—which probably explains why, in the majority of
cases the Court hears in which an agency construction is available, the Court declines to
invoke any deference regime whatsoever.”).
196 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No procedural principle
is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as
well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having
jurisdiction to determine it.”); see also, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482 (2011)
(making the same point and rejecting an argument as forfeited); Freytag v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 894–95 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (discussing forfeiture and reasons for it); CATHERINE T. STRUVE, 16AA
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be waived or forfeited in this manner. For that matter, waiver and forfeiture are
similar but not precisely the same. Waiver involves the “intentional
relinquishment” of a right or privilege,197 while forfeiture involves the failure—
whether intentional or not—to pursue a right or privilege by raising it in court.198
While courts may revive forfeited claims in the interest of justice,199 a claim
that is waived generally is waived for good.200 Conversely, “[a] right that cannot
be waived [also] cannot be forfeited.”201
A strand of cases and commentary has emerged in recent years suggesting
that an agency may waive or forfeit the eligibility of a particular agency
statutory interpretation for Chevron deference. Sometimes the issue arises
because the government has either disclaimed or failed to advocate adequately
for Chevron deference in briefs before a reviewing court.202 In other instances,
the issue stems from the government’s decision not to defend the agency
statutory interpretation under challenge.203 Cases addressing the issue thus
concern both waiver and forfeiture. As Justice Scalia once observed, the
Supreme Court has often used the terms interchangeably,204 and commentators
generally seem to have chosen the waiver label as a shorthand for both in the
Chevron context,205 so we will do the same.
Regardless, how courts categorize Chevron is highly relevant for thinking
about waiver questions. As we discuss below, the notion that the government
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURIS. § 3974.1(5) (4th ed. 2020) (describing the law of
waiver and forfeiture).
197 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
198 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); see also, e.g., Hamer v.
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 & 17 n.1 (2017) (describing the
difference between waiver and forfeiture in the context of a civil case); Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443, 458 & 458 n.13 (2004) (same).
199 Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 471 n.5 (2012) (citing Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198 (2006)) (“[A] federal court has the authority to resurrect only forfeited defenses.”).
200 United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A waiver is unlike a
forfeiture, for the consequence of a waiver is that the objection in question is
unreviewable.”); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1523–24
(2019) (making this observation).
201 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 894–95 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
202 See, e.g., Hays Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 1247, 1264 & 1264 n.18 (10th Cir. 2020);
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789 (2020) (mem.); Neustar, Inc. v.
FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017); cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (observing that the parties in the case “seem[ed] to assume,
without any analysis, that [the agency’s] interpretation of the relevant statutes is eligible for
Chevron review” before deciding that Chevron is not waivable).
203 See, e.g., Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
204 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 894–95 n.2 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring on the
judgment).
205 See, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, Essay, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 183 (2019) (describing the issue in terms of waiver); Rozansky,
supra note 27, at 1928 (same).
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can waive or forfeit its claim to Chevron deference is plausible if Chevron is a
rule of decision, but much less so if Chevron is a standard of review or a canon
of construction.

1. Emergence of the Chevron Waiver Argument
Courts have long been criticized for failing to mention Chevron at all in
cases where it would obviously seem to apply.206 In their study of Supreme
Court statutory interpretation cases, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer
documented that more than half of the cases decided between the Chevron
decision and the end of the Court’s 2005 term cited no deference doctrine at all
and instead saw the Court resolving the case based on its own ad hoc
reasoning.207 Thomas Merrill, writing on his time in the Office of the Solicitor
General in the early 1990s, described that office’s strategic decision to push
Chevron arguments in lower courts, where it felt they would be favorably
received, but not in the Supreme Court, where it felt there was a greater risk of
an anti-government ruling.208 Such cases are notable, however, more for their
silence regarding Chevron’s applicability, rather than any express claims or
pronouncements regarding the government’s waiver of Chevron deference.
As a more overt legal position, the concept of Chevron waiver seems to have
originated in the D.C. Circuit’s 2015 decision in Lubow v. Department of
State.209 The challengers and the government agreed in Lubow that the court
should evaluate regulation at issue using the Chevron framework, so the court
stated that it did not need to consider “potential arguments [the challengers]
might have made (but did not make) against” Chevron deference.210 In making
this statement, the Lubow court did not explain what argument it thought might
have been made.211 Instead, it cited Peter Pan Bus Lines v. Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration,212 in which the D.C. Circuit found a statutory
provision ambiguous but declined to evaluate the reasonableness of an agency’s
interpretation because the agency had indicated in the regulatory preamble that
it believed the statute to be unambiguous.213 Without further analysis, the court
in Lubow went on to say that “[t]he applicability of the Chevron framework does
not go to [the] court’s jurisdiction, and a party therefore can forfeit an argument
206 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 3.6.10, at 337 (6th ed. 2019); Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1108.
207 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1100.
208 See Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14.
209 See generally Lubow v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 783 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
210 Id. at 884.
211 See generally id.
212 Id. at 884 (citing Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471
F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
213 Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1353–
54 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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against deference by failing to raise it,” but the forfeiture issue in the case cited
for that proposition concerned the Appointments Clause, not Chevron.214
Irrespective of whether the Lubow court intended its words to create a new
legal argument, the D.C. Circuit appeared to extend its endorsement of Chevron
waiver in Neustar, Inc. v. FCC.215 The case concerned a Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) informal adjudication,216 which arguably
may not have been eligible for Chevron deference in any event in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.217 On this occasion,
however, the court held that the FCC had simply forfeited eligibility for Chevron
deference by failing to argue for it expressly.218 Although the FCC had asserted
that “[r]eview of the FCC’s interpretation of the statutes it administers is
governed by Chevron” and recited Chevron’s two steps in its brief’s separate
“Standard of Review” section,219 the court cited Lubow and held that these
“nominal[] references” were insufficient to invoke Chevron and that the agency
had “forfeited any claims to Chevron deference.”220
A subsequent D.C. Circuit panel walked back the Neustar holding a bit.221
In SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, the government defended
a Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) interpretation of the Copyright Act adopted
through formal rulemaking.222 On this occasion, the government neither cited
Chevron in its brief nor framed its arguments around Chevron’s two steps. But
the government also did not assert de novo review. Instead, the government
contended that the court should defer to the CRB unless its interpretation was
“arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or not supported by substantial
evidence.”223 The court, by contrast, observed that it had “previously applied
the Chevron framework when reviewing the [CRB’s] interpretation of the same
statutory provision.”224 It acknowledged that its decision in Neustar “held that
an agency can forfeit its ability to obtain deferential review under Chevron by
failing to invoke Chevron in its briefing,” but maintained that the Neustar
214 Lubow, 783 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added) (citing Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam)).
215 Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
216 Id. at 888–89.
217 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226−27 (2001) (requiring agency
action to carry the force of law to obtain Chevron deference); id. at 239 n.1 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (finding unclear whether the Court’s approach would apply to informal as well
as formal adjudications).
218 Neustar, 857 F.3d at 893–94.
219 Brief for Respondents at 26–27, Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886 (D. C. Cir. 2017)
(No. 15-1080), 2015 WL 9250677, at *26–27.
220 Neustar, 857 F.3d at 894.
221 SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
222 Id. at 45–46.
223 See Final Brief for Appellees at 18, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
904 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 16-1159) (quoting Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
224 SoundExchange, 904 F.3d at 53–54.
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opinion “did not indicate a ‘magic words’ requirement.”225 The court then
distinguished Neustar on the ground that the underlying FCC orders in that case
also “show[ed] no invocation of Chevron deference for this matter,” and
additionally recognized that the FCC’s action in Neustar, as an informal
adjudication, might not have been eligible for Chevron deference in the first
place.226 The court then concluded that Chevron deference was appropriate
because the CRB’s rulemaking was “the kind of interpretive exercise to which
review under Chevron generally applies” and the agency, in acting, had both
considered the statute’s text, history, purpose, and surrounding case law and
asserted the reasonableness of its interpretation.227
Finally, the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the government’s ability to
waive Chevron review in Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, upholding a regulation banning bump stocks.228 In Guedes, the
agency invoked Chevron by name in its regulatory preamble.229 Before the D.C.
Circuit, however, the government maintained that de novo review was
appropriate and that “Chevron plays no role in this case” with little
explanation.230 That litigating position did not convince the court. Here again,
the court noted that the agency had advanced its interpretation in a legislative
rule using notice-and-comment rulemaking, which ordinarily would mean
eligibility for Chevron deference under Mead.231 Although the court cited the
agency’s express invocation of Chevron in its regulatory preamble as further
evidence of the regulation’s legislative character, the court’s analysis makes
clear that satisfaction of Mead’s force of law requirement alone was enough for
the interpretation in question to be eligible for Chevron deference.232
To make its position even more clear, the D.C. Circuit in Guedes then
proceeded to reject outright the possibility that an agency can either waive or
forfeit Chevron deference for one of its actions.233 The court also noted several
practical and doctrinal tensions that made Chevron an “awkward conceptual fit
for the doctrines of forfeiture and waiver.”234 Chevron, is a “doctrine about

225 Id. at 54.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 54–55 (citing 81 Fed. Reg. 26,316, 26,332 (May 2, 2016)).
228 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.

Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.).
229 Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514, 66,526–27 (Dec. 26, 2018)
(codified at 27 C.F.R. § 447–79 (2018)).
230 Brief for Appellees at 37–38, Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (Nos. 19-5042–19-5044), 2019 WL
1200603, at *37.
231 Guedes, 920 F.3d at 6, 20.
232 See id. at 17–19.
233 Id. at 21–22. Judge Henderson, dissenting on other grounds, declined to reach the
issue of Chevron waiver. See id. at 41 n.10 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 22.
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statutory meaning,” according to the court, “not a ‘right’ or ‘privilege’
belonging to a litigant.”235
Although the D.C. Circuit, after contemplation, seems to have moved away
from its early embrace of Chevron waiver, other circuits have addressed or at
least acknowledged the issue.236 In Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of the
Interior, the Fourth Circuit rejected outright Chevron’s waivability, labeling the
doctrine a standard of review that cannot be waived and must be assessed
independently by the court.237 The Second Circuit in New York v. Department
of Justice seems to have reached the opposite conclusion, noting disagreement
between other circuits and interpreting the statute de novo because the
government did not claim Chevron deference.238
The Tenth Circuit appears divided, at least for now, over the question of
Chevron’s waivability. In Hays Medical Center v. Azar, that court considered
whether Medicare reimbursement regulations adopted by the Department of
Health and Human Services were arbitrary and capricious under the State Farm
doctrine.239 In its brief, the government attempted to recast its argument by
citing Chevron rather than State Farm.240 The court rejected this reframing in a
long footnote in which it contended that the government’s “perfunctory and
fleeting invocation of Chevron waives [its] argument for Chevron
deference.”241 A few weeks later, in Aposhian v. Barr, a different Tenth Circuit
panel considered an interlocutory appeal regarding the same bump-stock
regulations at stake in the Guedes case discussed above.242 Again, the
government disavowed reliance on Chevron, and Aposhian argued that the
government consequently had waived Chevron deference.243 A divided panel
disagreed, observing that Aposhian had framed his own arguments in terms of
Chevron’s two steps and, thus, had invited the Court to do the same.244 A
dissenting judge disagreed, contending that the court should respect the
government’s disavowal of Chevron deference.245 The Tenth Circuit has
granted en banc review in Aposhian to consider, among other questions, whether
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2018)

(describing a circuit split and declining to take a position).
237 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018).
238 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 101 & 101 n.17 (2d Cir. 2020),
rehearing denied en banc, 964 F.3d 150 (mem.).
239 Hays Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 1247, 1250–51, 1264 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011)).
240 See Brief for Appellee at 19, Hays Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2020)
(No. 17-3232), 2018 WL 1634055, at *19.
241 Hays, 956 F.3d at 1264 n.18.
242 See Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 2020).
243 Brief for Appellees at 36, Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969 (10th Cir. 2020) (No. 194036), 2019 WL 4054816, at *36 (“Plaintiff’s discussion of deference under [Chevron] has
no bearing on the resolution of this case.”).
244 Aposhian, 958 F.3d at 980–82.
245 Id. at 998 (Carson, J., dissenting).
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“Chevron step-two deference depend[s] on one or both parties invoking it, i.e.,
can it be waived?”246
Finally, the Supreme Court has offered its own signals that it might be
receptive to the Chevron waiver argument. Justice Gorsuch in particular seems
to favor the idea that Chevron can be waived. Writing in dissent in BNSF
Railway Co. v. Loos, Justice Gorsuch expressly noted that the party claiming the
validity and support of the administering agency’s interpretation of the relevant
statute “devoted scarcely any of its briefing to Chevron” and, at oral argument,
“didn’t even mention the case until the final seconds.”247 Justice Gorsuch had
other problems with the agency’s interpretation in that case, calling it “an
inferior interpretation of the law that may be more the product of politics than a
scrupulous reading of the statute.”248
Subsequently, however, in a statement accompanying the Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari in the Guedes case, Justice Gorsuch expressly rejected the
D.C. Circuit’s application of Chevron.249 He contended that Chevron “has
nothing to say about the proper interpretation of the law before us” because “the
government expressly waived reliance on Chevron.”250 He cited Eskridge and
Baer among other sources in claiming that the Court “has often declined to apply
Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it.”251
Whether the rest of the Court favors the Chevron waiver argument is less
clear. In County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Justice Breyer for the Court
observed that the Solicitor General had not asked for Chevron deference for an
Environmental Protection Agency “Interpretive Statement.”252 The EPA’s
interpretive statement was the sort of informal, subregulatory guidance that the
Supreme Court in Mead suggested was not eligible for Chevron deference in the
first place.253 And Justice Breyer went on to acknowledge that the Court found
the agency’s interpretation “neither persuasive nor reasonable” in any event.254
Further, as previously noted, Justice Breyer has always held a somewhat
idiosyncratic and mushy view of Chevron and Skidmore as a single, blended,
multifactor standard.255 Nevertheless, his mere observation that the government
had failed to argue for Chevron deference prompted Aaron Nielson to wonder

246 Order at 1, Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-4036), 2020
WL 5268055, *1.
247 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 908–09 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
248 Id.
249 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789–
90 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., statement).
250 Id. at 789.
251 Id. at 790 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1121–24 (2008)).
252 Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020).
253 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 234 (2001).
254 Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1474.
255 See supra note 141–42 and accompanying text.
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whether the Court was holding “that Skidmore, rather than Chevron, applied
when agency counsel doesn’t argue for deference.”256

2. Implications of Categorization for Chevron Waiver
Many judicial opinions merely hint at the possibility of Chevron waiver, for
example in refusing to consider a belated argument that a relevant regulation
itself is unreasonable or invalid,257 or by suggesting that similarly-situated
parties might argue that particular types of agency pronouncements are
ineligible for Chevron review.258 Most of the opinions that more clearly support
Chevron’s waivability offer little analysis as to why their authors believe that
Chevron is waivable. They merely note that the government disavowed
Chevron’s applicability or failed to claim Chevron deference adequately or at
all.259
In a few instances, however, circuit courts have engaged the question of
Chevron’s categorization as part of considering whether Chevron is waivable.
For example, one of the most fascinating aspects of the D.C. Circuit’s initial
embrace and subsequent rejection of the argument, described above, is the way
in which that court’s discussions of the issue reflect the different potential
categorizations of Chevron as a doctrine. That court in Lubow based its waiver
conclusion in part on its characterization of Chevron as nonjurisdictional.260 By
contrast, that same court in Guedes decided that Chevron could not be waived
at least partly because it saw Chevron as resembling interpretive canons like
expressio unius and constitutional avoidance.261
Other circuits clearly appreciate the significance of Chevron’s
categorization for the question of waiver. Summarizing the disagreement, but
without reaching its own conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit in Martin v. Social
Security Administration contended that some courts treat Chevron as “a nonjurisdictional argument that parties may waive,” while others “analogiz[e]
Chevron deference to a standard of review that the court must independently
256 Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: More Chevron Waiver, YALE J.

REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuitreview-reviewed-more-chevron-waiver/ [https://perma.cc/B3PW-J7FN].
257 See, e.g., Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2016) (alternately
describing a “late-blooming argument” that an applicable regulation was invalid as a
“Chevron-based unreasonableness argument” and “a Chevron review argument”).
258 See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 2010)
(observing that “agencies’ one-time statutory interpretations, if lacking in precedential force
with respect to future actions, may not warrant [Chevron] deference” because they lack legal
force, but declining to consider the question because the parties agreed that Chevron
applied).
259 See, e.g., Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008).
260 Lubow v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 783 F.3d 877, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
261 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 22–23
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.).
ON
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assess.”262 The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Chevron’s waivability in Sierra
Club was premised explicitly on its belief that Chevron is a standard of
review.263 The Tenth Circuit, too, clearly views Chevron’s categorization and
its waivability as potentially linked. In granting en banc review in the Aposhian
case, that court requested briefing not only on the Chevron waiver question but
also on whether “the Supreme Court intend[ed] for the Chevron framework to
operate as a standard of review, a tool of statutory interpretation, or an analytical
framework that applies where a government agency has interpreted an
ambiguous statute,” among other questions.264
Waiver and forfeiture both presuppose the existence of a right or privilege
on the litigant’s part.265 Thus, to decide whether a particular right or privilege
can be forfeited or waived, one must first determine what that right or privilege
is—whether derived from the Constitution, a statute, an agency regulation, or
common law. Rules of decision operationalize and effectuate those rights or
privileges. For example, the Due Process Clause gives parties facing the
government deprivation of a protected interest a legal right to adequate
procedures.266 Courts apply the three-part standard of Mathews v. Eldridge to
evaluate procedural due process claims.267 A litigant who fails to argue timely
that an agency’s procedures violated the Due Process Clause waives or forfeits
that claim, depriving a court of the opportunity to apply the standard of
Mathews. The APA gives interested parties a legal right to adequate notice of
and opportunity to comment on proposed regulations.268 Courts apply a logical
outgrowth test to assess whether proposed and final regulations are too different
for notice to have been adequate.269 If a litigant does not challenge the adequacy

262 Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2018).
263 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We

therefore must independently assure ourselves that any statutory interpretation provided by
[the agency] qualifies for Chevron review and if not, whether it is entitled to a lesser form of
deference . . . .”).
264 Order at 1, Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969 (10th Cir. 2020) (No 19-4036), 2020 WL
5268055, at *1.
265 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (describing forfeiture as the
“failure to make the timely assertion of a right”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(describing waiver as the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege”); see also Waiving Chevron Deference, supra note 200, at 1523.
266 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (making the same point)
(subsequent history omitted).
267 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–35 (identifying three factors).
268 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
269 See, e.g., Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010)
(describing the logical outgrowth test for determining compliance with APA § 553(b) and
(c)). See generally Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1996) (describing and rationalizing the standard).
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of an agency’s notice, it waives or forfeits that claim, and the reviewing court
has no occasion to apply the logical outgrowth test.
Not so a standard of review. As typically understood, a standard of review
is an instruction to a reviewing court regarding the appropriate framework or
attitude to use in evaluating a particular claim or issue, rather than a right or
privilege for a party to assert.270 A standard of review may be perceived as
favoring one party over another. The arbitrary and capricious standard and the
substantial evidence standard in in APA § 706(2), for example, both arguably
favor the government by requiring reviewing courts to be somewhat deferential
toward the agency’s findings.271 Standards of review are perceived as
sufficiently significant that how they work, or which one applies, sometimes
becomes its own separate issue or even the primary focus of a case.272 Congress
often identifies by statute the standard of review it wants courts to apply in
evaluating certain issues or claims.273 Ultimately, however, courts have an
independent duty to ascertain the applicable standard of review that is
independent of any action or inaction by the parties. In other words, standards
of review simply are not waivable.274
For similar reasons, one does not normally think of a party waiving or
forfeiting a canon of construction. Courts have made clear repeatedly that they
270 See, e.g., Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009); Worth v. Tyer, 276

F.3d 249, 262–63 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1992) (en banc).
271 See e.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (noting that the
substantial evidence standard’s “threshold . . . is not high”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983) (describing the
arbitrary and capricious standard as “narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency”).
272 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108–16 (1989)
(establishing a default standard of review for certain claims under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 681–86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (resolving at length a disagreement
over whether substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious was the applicable standard of
review); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2419 (2019) (elaborating while declining
to overturn Auer deference); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 226–27 (2001)
(holding that Skidmore rather than Chevron deference applies to agency interpretations that
lack the force of law).
273 See Kozel, supra note 150, at 1125 (“The Supreme Court has left no doubt that
specific interpretations of statutory provisions receive a unique, elevated form of deference
going forward.”).
274 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citing several circuits for “parties cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to
argue it”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 257 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2015) (“A party cannot waive, concede, or abandon the applicable standard of review.”);
Gardner, 568 F.3d at 879 (holding that the standard of review is an “unavoidable legal
question” that the court “must ask, and answer, in every case”); Worth, 276 F.3d at 262–63
n.4 (“[T]he court, not the parties, must determine the standard of review, and therefore, it
cannot be waived.”).

650

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:4

need not depend on a party to raise a particular canon before using it,275 nor are
courts bound by parties’ arguments regarding the best tools and methods for
resolving statutory meaning.276 Correspondingly, canons of construction are not
precedential.277 Hence, it has been suggested that Chevron and waiver are an
“awkward conceptual fit.”278
Still, the cases and commentary to date mostly dance around rather than
squarely addressing the implications of Chevron’s categorization for the waiver
question. James Durling and E. Garrett West contend that Chevron should not
be waivable whether one categorizes it as a canon, a standard of review, or a
“precedent,” but they do not consider the implications of a Chevron rule of
decision.279 Jeremy Rozansky seems mostly to assume that Chevron is a
standard of review.280 An unsigned student note in the Harvard Law Review
acknowledged that standards of review are not waivable because they represent
claims that are not rights or privileges, but then compared Chevron to canons of
construction.281
Rules of decision, standards of review, and canons of construction each
come with a set of precedents, understandings, and first principles surrounding
their waiver as well as their application. Failing to grapple with Chevron’s
proper categorization makes it difficult to know which collection of precedents,
understandings, and first principles to apply in evaluating the question of
Chevron waiver.

B. Stare Decisis and Overturning Chevron
Even more fundamentally, how we categorize Chevron may make a
difference in how we think about calls from Chevron’s critics to overturn the
doctrine. In this regard, when one contemplates the possibility of overturning
Chevron, two particular questions follow: First, how do stare decisis principles
275 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d
1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We . . . would give no mind to a litigant’s failure to
invoke interpretive canons such as expressio unius or constitutional avoidance even if she
intentionally left them out of her brief.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.).
276 See id.; see also Durling & West, supra note 205, at 190; Gary Lawson, Stipulating
the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2011); cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500
U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”).
277 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[C]anons are not
mandatory rules.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (“Canons
of construction need not be conclusive and are often countered, of course, by some maxim
pointing in a different direction.”); see also Kozel, supra note 150, at 1127–28.
278 Guedes, 920 F.3d at 22.
279 Durling & West, supra note 205, at 188.
280 Rozansky, supra note 27, at 1958–59 n.158 (discussing the implications of Congress
failing to codify Chevron as a standard of review).
281 Waiving Chevron Deference, supra note 200, at 1527–28.
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apply to the Chevron doctrine? And second, what would it mean to “overrule”
Chevron?
The principle of stare decisis is deceptively simple. It presumes that courts
should abide by their prior decisions to promote fairness, predictability, and
stability in the law.282 Stare decisis takes on “enhanced force” in the context of
statutory interpretation, because Congress can correct the judiciary’s
mistakes.283 But the Supreme Court has described stare decisis as a “principle
of policy”284 rather than “an inexorable command.”285 Randy Kozel has
described the process of deciding whether to adhere to precedent in a particular
case as “essentially indeterminate,”286 but the Court traditionally has recognized
several factors as relevant: the quality of the precedent’s reasoning; the
workability of the rule or standard established by the precedent; the precedent’s
consistency (or lack thereof) with related decisions; legal developments since
the precedent in question was decided, including changed understandings of the
underlying facts; and the effect of overruling the case on legitimate reliance
interests.287
Several observations about these factors are particularly relevant when
thinking about overturning Chevron. First, although Chevron and other

282 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019); Kimble v. Marvel

Entm’t, L.L.C., 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (citation omitted); Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991).
283 Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456. In this regard, the Court in Kimble cited Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989), which Congress subsequently
superseded by statute, as illustrative. See Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456; see also CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008) (documenting this history). But see Gamble,
139 S. Ct. at 1987–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the “legal (as opposed to
practical) basis for applying a heightened version of stare decisis to statutory-interpretation
decisions”).
284 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (quoting
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (same); Boys Mkts.,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (same).
285 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2478 (2018) (citing several cases for this language).
286 Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411,
414 (2010).
287 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (listing factors);
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (same); Janus, 138 S. Ct.
at 2478–79 (same). One source suggests that changed understandings of the facts underlying
a precedent may be another factor. See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45319, THE SUPREME COURT’S OVERRULING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT 17–18
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45319.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z5G-6WUZ]. The Court
seems to have taken into account changes in facts on the ground when it overturned precedent
in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097–98 (2018) (emphasizing “the present
realities of the interstate marketplace”). But contemporary Court decisions discussing stare
decisis principles have not recognized this factor as such.
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decisions explain at length the justifications for deference,288 the quality of that
reasoning may be in the eye of the beholder. But poor quality of reasoning alone
is usually insufficient to overrule a precedent.289 The Court generally will not
overrule even a poorly-reasoned precedent unless it concludes that the precedent
reached the incorrect result. After all, overruling a precedent generally entails
adopting a different rule or principle that would have yielded the opposite result
in the prior case.290 And, in this regard, the Court may take note of whether the
precedent was the result of a less-than-full vetting of the arguments291 or the
product of a sharply divided Court.292
Second, a precedent’s rule or standard is “unworkable” when it fails to
provide sufficient guidance to lower courts and others interpreting and applying
it.293 If a rule leaves lower courts with too much discretion, thereby leading to
unpredictable and inconsistent case outcomes, the Court can justify abandoning
it. For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court held
that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
working conditions of state employees when those employees performed
activities in “areas of traditional governmental functions.”294 Later concluding
that there was no reliable basis for distinguishing between “traditional” and
“nontraditional” government functions, the Court abandoned the Usery test and
held that Congress could impose wage and hour requirements that applied to
state employees.295 Disagreements over how Chevron operates and when it
applies complicate Chevron and leave it susceptible to claims that it is
unworkable. Irrespective of Chevron, however, disagreements over methods
and tools of statutory interpretation complicate that task.296 How much
complexity is attributable to Chevron as opposed to the milieu in which it
functions is debatable.
288 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,

980–82 (2005) (describing and justifying Chevron deference); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (same); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (same).
289 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (“[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the
belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”).
290 See, e.g., Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
291 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
292 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1991); cf. Gamble v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
293 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009).
294 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
295 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985)
(subsequent history omitted).
296 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29–54 (Oxford Univ. Press
2014) (offering thoughts on statutory interpretation methods); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at
2134–62 (reviewing and responding to Judge Katzmann’s book); Katzmann, supra note 40,
at 388–98 (responding to Justice Kavanaugh’s review).
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In addition to how one evaluates Chevron in accordance with the various
factors, however, how one categorizes Chevron ought to be relevant as well.
Rules of decision seem to fit most naturally within the stare decisis framework.
In theory, rules provide for a clear outcome given a set of factual predicates.
Their mandatory nature makes them particularly likely to create significant
reliance interests. And it is fairly easy to understand what it means to overturn
a rule: under the relevant precedent, a given set of facts should lead to outcome
A, but the Court rejects that precedent and adopts a rule that results in outcome
B instead. Most of those calling for Chevron to be overruled seem to conceive
of the doctrine as a rule of decision.297 If that is correct, the Court would
presumably recognize the same stare decisis protections and apply the same
factors that attend any other legal rule in deciding whether to overturn it.
At the other end of the spectrum are interpretive canons, which generally
are thought to lack precedential value.298 While there is an ongoing debate over
whether interpretive methodologies should receive stare decisis effect, there is
broad agreement that at present they do not.299 Instead, canons provide a
methodological tool that courts may or may not choose to apply in the
appropriate circumstances. While courts often apply them only after
ascertaining a particular trigger, such as ambiguity, nothing obligates them to
do so.300 One justice may be more or less likely to rely on a particular canon
than another, but methodological commitments usually do not bind future
courts.301 Because canons are not precedential, do not bind courts, and
frequently do not by themselves determine case outcomes,302 “overruling” a
canon as opposed to simply not using it makes little sense.
Many who place Chevron in the category of canon suggest that Chevron is
not entitled to stare decisis effect at all. Raso and Eskridge argue that, because
Chevron is a canon, it is “not a precedent,”303 identifying several features that
make canons incompatible with a “rule-based stare decisis.”304 Because the
general regulated public may care more about the meaning of a statute than the
interpretive methodology that leads to that result, overruling a component of
that methodology likely does not implicate any reliance interests. And because
297 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(criticizing Chevron as a source of “reflexive deference”); Beerman, supra note 30, at 785
(describing Chevron as a “judge-made rule”).
298 See Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1765–66 (discussing the differences
between canons and precedents).
299 Compare Gluck, supra note 32, at 1765–66, with Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski,
Essay, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1575–76 (2014). For
further discussion, see Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teaches Us About the Rest
of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 613–14 (2014).
300 See Gluck, supra note 299, at 613 & 613 n.26.
301 See id.; see also Kozel, supra note 150, at 1127–28.
302 See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 42, at 68 (“[Canons] are merely a factor to
be considered, or a tiebreaker in close cases.”).
303 Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 62, at 1727.
304 Id. at 1810.
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statutory interpretation encompasses a cluster of competing and potentially
inconsistent values, a clean-cut stare decisis analysis may not even be
possible.305 Randy Kozel takes this point a step further, arguing that Chevron is
an interpretive methodology such that one Justice cannot bind a future
Justice.306
Standards of review fall somewhere in the middle. They are binding in the
sense that a court must identify and apply the appropriate standard of review in
each case.307 The Supreme Court can and often will remand a case for
reconsideration based on a lower court’s failure to apply the correct standard of
review.308 But the significant variation and malleability with which courts apply
standards of review, as well as the difficulty in determining whether a standard
of review is outcome determinative, undermine the binary choice that is usually
involved in deciding whether or not to overrule a precedent.
In practice, courts have tended to adjust and clarify the meaning of standards
of review over time rather than to overrule and replace them. Consider, for
example, the substantial evidence standard for reviewing agency factfinding.309
The Supreme Court long ago articulated the boilerplate expression of what
constitutes substantial evidence, describing it as “more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”310 Over the years, applying the standard in case after
case, the courts have operationalized that boilerplate, yielding an extensive
jurisprudence with detailed understandings and exceptions for what is and is not
substantial evidence.311
If a standard of review derives from common law rather than statutory text,
then of course the Supreme Court can overrule the standard and replace it with
305 See id.
306 Kozel, supra note 150, at 1128–29.
307 See, e.g., U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236,

256 n.6 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is always the duty of our court to apply the proper standard of
review . . . without regard to the . . . parties’ arguments or their agreements to the
contrary.”); Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing that “the
correct standard of review . . . is . . . an unavoidable legal question we must ask, and answer,
in every case”).
308 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016)
(remanding for reconsideration using de novo review rather than Chevron) (subsequent
history omitted); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238–39 (2001) (remanding for
reconsideration using the Skidmore standard rather than Chevron).
309 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
310 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); see also NLRB v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (using virtually identical
language prior to congressional adoption of the APA).
311 See, e.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155–57 (2019) (holding that an
expert’s refusal to provide her data did not prevent her testimony from qualifying as
substantial evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (holding that hearsay
can constitute substantial evidence); Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 (holding that
substantial evidence requires consideration of the whole record); see also HICKMAN &
PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 10.2, at 1082–1105 (documenting cases).
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something else.312 But many standards of review are statutory, meaning that
Congress can replace them but the Court cannot.313 Yet, the statutory
requirement is naught but the label—e.g., the use of a phrase like substantial
evidence or arbitrary and capricious.314 The real meat of any statutory standard
of review lies in the judicially-developed boilerplate and operational details.315
Thus, even with a statutory standard of review, courts have a fair degree of
latitude in adjusting over time the details that operationalize the standard. It is
harder to conceptualize overruling a mood that is difficult to capture in words
in the first place. Overturning the label may shift the rhetoric but perhaps not
quite the mood. That malleability may be why courts more typically alter
standards of review through iterative clarification rather than replacement.

IV. CHEVRON IS A STANDARD OF REVIEW
Chevron is a multifaceted doctrine, often applied inconsistently, and thus
readily susceptible to being categorized in several ways simultaneously—
especially when the categories themselves are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence is sufficiently variable
that one can find examples to support almost any reasonable characterization of
the doctrine. Case law provides plenty of evidence to support describing
Chevron as a rule of decision or a canon of construction. Nevertheless, we are
convinced that, when categorizing Chevron might matter, Chevron is best
considered a standard of review.
Part of our reasoning for categorizing Chevron as a standard of review is
simply impressionistic, based on our comparison of Chevron cases with the
categorical alternatives as we understand them and have explained them in this
Article. Too indeterminate to be a rule of decision, yet too dominant to be a
canon of construction, Chevron best resembles a standard of review by
providing a framework for judicial analysis of challenges to the validity of
agency statutory interpretations and describing the proper judicial attitude when
statutory text and traditional interpretive methods fail to provide clear answers.
Casting Chevron as a rule of decision discounts, and thus discourages, all of the
questions and analysis Mead and Chevron together contemplate before a court
defers. Treating Chevron as a canon of construction renders it optional and risks
312 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 371
(1997) (“Precedents can be overruled just as legislators and statutes can be changed.”).
313 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012).
314 Williams v. Commonwealth, Real Estate Bd., 698 S.E.2d 917, 930 (Va. Ct. App.
2010) (determining arbitrary and capricious actions as “willful and unreasonable” or without
“determining principle” from prior case law as opposed to the Virginia Statute) (quoting Sch.
Bd. of Norfolk v. Wescott, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Va. 1997)).
315 See, e.g., Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of
Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 248–49 (2009) (“[W]hen the language of the
standard itself is vague, courts are more likely to define the standard, heaping on qualifiers
and explanations so that it becomes more convoluted over time.”).
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judicial intrusion into a policymaking space that judges are ill equipped to
occupy.
Nevertheless, our view that Chevron is a standard of review is informed as
well by our perception that Chevron should be regarded as a judicial
construction of the APA’s scope of review provision, including but not limited
to the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA § 706(2)(A).316 As described
above, the operational details of standards of review often evolve as courts apply
them to many cases over time. As explained below, changes in administrative
law doctrine and agency rulemaking practices in the late 1960s and 1970s gave
agencies greater latitude to exercise policymaking discretion through
rulemaking. Chevron emerged as courts applied APA § 706—admittedly more
implicitly than explicitly—in evaluating challenges to agency regulations
adopted under these contemporary conditions. The Supreme Court has never
said so unequivocally, but it has danced around and implied a relationship
between Chevron and the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard for years. If
Chevron fits this characterization, then like the arbitrary and capricious standard
that it construes, Chevron is both a standard of review and more anchored to
statutory text than its detractors like to admit.

A. Statutory Connections
Section 706 of the APA, entitled “Scope of Review,” describes the role of
a court reviewing agency action, in pertinent part, as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall– . . .
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be–
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. . . .317

Importantly, the statute does not explain exactly what it means for agency action
actually to be arbitrary and capricious. The terms are hardly self-defining.
Looking them up in a dictionary offers little guidance as to their application in
the context of judicial review of agency action.318

316 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Is Not Inconsistent with

the APA, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/
nc/chevron-is-not-inconsistent-with-the-apa-by-cass-r-sunstein/ [https://perma.cc/M5LM74PW] (reaching a similar conclusion, although based mostly on different evidence than we
discuss below).
317 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
318 See Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Capricious, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (neither implicate judicial review of agencies).

2020]

CATEGORIZING CHEVRON

657

The provision goes on in § 706(2)(C) to counsel reviewing courts to set
aside agency actions that are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.”319 Putting that provision together with
the flush language at the beginning of § 706, instructing reviewing courts to
“decide all relevant questions of law” and to “interpret . . . statutory
provisions,”320 it seems apparent that Congress intended courts rather than
agencies to review agency statutory interpretations de novo, rather than
deferentially.
But what happens when traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to
answer the relevant interpretive question? No one seriously doubts that
contemporary statutes confer extensive policymaking discretion on agencies.321
Although many such statutory grants are explicit—e.g., expressly instructing
agencies to adopt regulations to accomplish a specific, congressionallyidentified purpose322—one of Chevron’s central insights was that the line
between statutory interpretation and policymaking discretion is not always so
easy to draw.323 Different judges may disagree as to where that line falls, but
most at least acknowledge that the line exists.324
319 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012).
320 Id. § 706(2).
321 Indeed, one question that divides the Justices is whether and when Congress

delegates too much discretion to agency officials. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute at issue was “delegation
running riot”) (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)), rehearing denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 (mem.).
322 See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142, 2144 (2016)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4)); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002)
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 11506(c)(1) (1994)); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 79
(2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12116); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 & 525 n.2, 528
(1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a) & 1383(d)(1) (1982, Supp. V)).
323 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit.”); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA
Administrator to adopt national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards as
necessary to protect public health and welfare based on specified criteria); 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(d)(1)–(2) (2012) (requiring the FCC to adopt regulations to facilitate the availability
of telephone service network elements to the extent “access . . . is necessary” and “failure to
provide access . . . would impair the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide
the services that it seeks to offer”).
324 Compare Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2153–54 (arguing that judges should be most
willing to defer to agencies when a statute uses “broad and open-ended terms like
‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable,’” but should strive to find the “best
reading” when dealing with more specific statutory provisions), with Katzmann, supra note
40, at 398 (suggesting that Justice Kavanaugh’s approach may “not reflect appropriate
deference to Congress”). For further discussion, see Scalia, supra note 9, at 520–21
(discussing what it means for a statute to be ambiguous). But see Raymond M. Kethledge,
Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 323 (2017) (“I personally have never had occasion to reach
Chevron’s step two in any of my cases . . . .”).
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At this point, it is useful to recall that the standards of the APA’s scope of
review provision are not mutually exclusive but rather are understood to be
cumulative.325 Agency exercises of policymaking discretion typically fall under
the purview of the APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious standard, which is
deferential and does not allow a court to substitute its own judgment for that of
the agency.326 It is fairly obvious that agency actions that exceed statutory
authority correspondingly are not in accordance with law, and thus are arbitrary
and capricious.327 But agency actions that do not exceed statutory authority as
a matter of mere interpretation still can be arbitrary and capricious and thus must
be set aside as well.328 Wherever the precise line between statutory
interpretation and policymaking discretion falls, when traditional tools of
statutory interpretation fail and policymaking takes over, the arbitrary and
capricious standard comes into play.
The Supreme Court has never fully articulated this analysis, but it has hinted
at it (or more) on a number of occasions.329 In the Chevron opinion itself, the
Court did not cite APA § 706, but it used language evocative of that provision.
In describing Chevron’s second step, the Court spoke of legislative regulations
adopted pursuant to express delegations of authority as “given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute”330—language not precisely aligned with APA § 706(2)(A), but not far

325 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (making this observation); Olenhouse v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 n.25 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
326 See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (describing
the arbitrary and capricious standard in these terms) (subsequent history omitted); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983)
(same); Atl. Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1384, 1388–89 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
327 See, e.g., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 928 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(treating § 706(2)(A), § 706(2)(C), and Chevron as synonymous in this context); Nw. Envtl.
Advocates v. U.S. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1733
(2011) (“Although these standards differ in their phrasing, each attempts to pair judicial
deference with a reasoned decisionmaking requirement.”).
328 Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517–18, 521–23 (2009) (concluding that the
statute was ambiguous but remanding without evaluating the reasonableness of the agency’s
interpretation because the agency had based its action on its belief that the statute was
unambiguous); Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1149–51 (9th Cir.
2013) (same); Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350,
1353–55 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (collecting circuit cases in support of this proposition).
329 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (citing
APA § 706 in conjunction with Chevron) (subsequent history omitted); Smiley v. Citibank
(S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (same); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Dep’t of
Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 98–99 (1999) (citing APA § 706 in conjunction with Chevron)
(subsequent history omitted); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 316–17
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron is consistent with APA § 706).
330 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
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from it, either.331 In describing Chevron deference more generally, the Court
has frequently used the same or similar phrasing,332 and not just with respect to
legislative regulations.333 Moreover, in discussing delegations that are “implicit
rather than explicit,” the Court in Chevron spoke of deferring to “reasonable”
interpretations.334 The Court often has used the word “reasonable” or
derivations thereof as representing the opposite of arbitrary and capricious, not
only in describing Chevron step two335 but also in its discussions of APA
§ 706(2)(A) more generally.336
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court again described certain agency
actions as being worthy of deference of Chevron step two unless they are
“procedurally defective, arbitrary and capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute,” and cited APA § 706(2)(A) and (D) as well as the
Chevron opinion itself for this proposition.337 In a footnote, the Court qualified
this proposition by observing that such deference obviously would be
inappropriate if the interpretation at issue exceeded the agency’s jurisdiction
under the statute, citing APA § 706(2)(C).338
Finally, although sometimes the Court’s Chevron step two analysis seems
focused on statutory interpretation alone,339 in several cases, the Court has more
explicitly linked Chevron step two analysis and APA arbitrary and capricious
review as interpreted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.340 The
331 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
332 See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 524 (2014);

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 157 (2013); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997);
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528 (1990); Atkins v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 154, 162 (1986).
333 See, e.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (concerning
NLRB adjudication).
334 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
335 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 395–96 (2008); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526
U.S. 380, 383 (1999) (subsequent history omitted).
336 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1933 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard
requires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained.”); see also Arent v.
Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing “whether the agency’s regulations
were reasonable” as “a hallmark of traditional arbitrary and capricious review”).
337 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
338 Id. at 227 n.6.
339 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387–92 (1999) (rejecting
an agency interpretation at Chevron step two for failing to give full effect to the limiting
quality of the word “necessary”).
340 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42–43 (1983) (interpreting the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard as requiring
agencies to justify their discretionary choices contemporaneously with their actions); see
also HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 3.5.1 (discussing the connection at length);
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Court in that case explained the APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious
standard as requiring agencies to explain and justify their discretionary choices
contemporaneously with their actions.341 Thus, for example, in National Cable
and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court
applied Chevron to evaluate an FCC statutory interpretation, then cited both
Chevron and State Farm in the course of concluding that the agency’s
interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference because the agency
adequately explained why it chose and why it changed that interpretation.342 In
Judulang v. Holder, although the Court analyzed the Board of Immigration
Appeals adjudication at issue through the State Farm lens, it noted that the
government had argued in favor of applying Chevron step two instead.343 In
response to the government’s argument, the Court observed, “[w]ere we to do
so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask
whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”344 In
Michigan v. EPA, the Court recognized that the terms “appropriate and
necessary” in the Clean Air Act could support more than one reasonable
interpretation.345 Nevertheless, citing State Farm, the Court concluded that the
EPA’s interpretation of the statute was not “appropriate,” and thus was not
reasonable at Chevron step two, because it failed to take adequate account of
cost and did “significantly more harm than good.”346 And in Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, the Court declared that a regulation in which the Labor
Department changed its interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act was
ineligible for Chevron deference because it failed to justify the change, and thus
was arbitrary and capricious.347
To be sure, Chevron is not the only interpretation of the arbitrary and
capricious standard of APA § 706(2)(A). That standard also comes into play in
reviewing agency findings of fact348 as well as claims that an agency has failed
to engage in reasoned decisionmaking independent of statutory
Levin, supra note 10, at 1285–86 (arguing that Chevron step two overlaps considerably with
State Farm analysis).
341 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43.
342 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–82,
986, 1000–01 (2005).
343 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 & 52 n.7, 53 (2011).
344 Id. at 52 n.7.
345 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–08 (2015).
346 Id. at 2707, 2713–14.
347 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (subsequent
history omitted).
348 See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1397 (11th Cir. 1998)
(describing the substantial evidence standard as “no more than a recitation of the application
of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard to factual findings”) (quoting Md. People’s Counsel
v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 682–86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing
the relationship between the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence
standard in the context of reviewing agency factual findings).
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interpretation.349 In a sense, the arbitrary and capricious standard is a standard
of review that carries different boilerplate descriptions for different types of
claims brought under the APA more generally. Regardless, the arbitrary and
capricious standard is broadly recognized as a standard of review. If Chevron is
perceived as a construction of APA § 706, then it stands to reason that Chevron
is a standard of review as well.

B. Historical Grounding
Chevron’s detractors particularly may argue that the mere ability to
reconcile Chevron with the text of APA § 706 is inadequate reason to do so.
Certainly, no one could argue that Congress intended to endorse Chevron as
such when it enacted the APA, since the Court did not decide Chevron until
decades later.350 Also, the Court has been less than clear in explaining the
connection between the APA and Chevron. Meanwhile, judges and legal
scholars have described the Chevron doctrine as all of revolutionary,351
accidental,352 and entirely judge-made353—none of which quite fits the solid
textual connection between Chevron and the APA we suggest. All of these
characterizations of Chevron are accurate to a point, yet none tells the complete
story.
349 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,

1905 (2020) (describing APA § 706(2)(A) as “requir[ing] agencies to engage in ‘reasoned
decisionmaking’”) (citation omitted); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2398 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that an agency
violates the arbitrary and capricious standard when it “flunk[s] the test of ‘reasoned
decisionmaking’” by failing to give “a satisfactory explanation for its action”) (quoting
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,
139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (observing that APA § 706(2)(A) limits the Court “to ensuring
that [the agency] remained ‘within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking’”) (citation
omitted) (subsequent history omitted).
350 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). By comparison, the APA was adopted in 1946. See Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.
351 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion contained several features that can only be
described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the time.”) (footnote
omitted).
352 See, e.g., Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment
on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377, 1379 (1997) (“After all, we have a
‘Chevron two-step’ only because of the accident of Justice Stevens’ prose in Chevron. And
it was clearly an accident.”).
353 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the
judicial duty.”), vacated, In re Gutierrez Brizuela, No. AXXX XX3 099, 2018 WL 1756899
(B.I.A. Jan. 4, 2018); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 192 (1998) (“Chevron is actually an aggressive fashioning of
judge-made law by the Court.”).
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For example, it is generally understood that Justice Stevens, the Chevron
opinion’s author, did not mean to announce a major doctrinal shift.354 Justice
Breyer, too, has suggested that “Chevron made no relevant change” to prior
doctrine except to “focus[] upon an additional, separate legal reason for
deferring to certain agency determinations”—i.e., congressional delegation.355
Certainly Chevron enjoys landmark status, and the doctrine’s sheer
pervasiveness belies the suggestion that it made no change at all. Nevertheless,
one can see glimmers of Chevron in case law dating as far back as the 1930s, if
not earlier.
We do not mean to suggest that courts in the 1930s conceived of or
anticipated Chevron as it functions today. But as we have discussed, standards
of review evolve, with courts filling in details over time to operationalize labels
that themselves at best convey an approximate judicial attitude or mood.356
Indeed, the best explanation of Chevron is as an evolutionary adjustment to the
courts’ construction of APA § 706 and the arbitrary and capricious standard,
adopted in reaction to the rise of contemporary agency rulemaking and other
changes in administrative law doctrine and interpretations of the APA in the late
1960s and 1970s.
Enacted in 1946, the APA is often described at least in part as a codification
of existing legal understandings and administrative practices as they existed
prior to its enactment.357 Judicial deference to agency legal interpretations was
not a new concept when the APA was adopted.358 Courts in the early twentieth
century recognized that statutes often left certain matters to the discretion of
agency officials and declined to inquire too deeply into those discretionary
actions.359 Agency actions from this period were perceived as addressing
questions that involved a conglomeration of law, fact, and policymaking
354 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental

Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 275–76 (2014) (summarizing the evidence that the Court
did not believe Chevron was a major departure from prior law).
355 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
356 See supra Part II.B.
357 See, e.g., Comment, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or
Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 673 (1947) (“In some respects [the APA] is simply a codification
of existing law and practice[.]”); see also McNollgast, The Political Origins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 180, 181–83 (1999) (observing that,
“[a]ccording to most legal scholarship, the purpose of the APA was to codify and rationalize
existing practice[s]” while arguing that Congress also “refashioned” some practices to
accomplish political goals).
358 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 n.14
(1984) (collecting cases predating the APA).
359 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 246, at 880
(1951) (“The courts have long refused to substitute judgment on some questions which are
analytically law, and on many questions of discretion, policy, and judgment.”); FINAL
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S.
DOC. NO. 77-8, at 98 (1941) (recognizing “the growth of administrative rule making” due in
part to “[t]he increasing use by Congress of ‘skeleton legislation,’ to be amplified by
executive regulations”).
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discretion.360 Consequently, many cases both before and immediately after the
APA’s enactment talked about statutes conferring discretion on agency officials
and limiting the “scope” of judicial review.361
For example, in 1936, in AT&T Co. v. United States, the Court considered
a challenge to FCC regulations establishing uniform accounting standards for
ratemaking.362 The statute offered little interpretive guidance, simply
instructing the FCC “in its discretion, [to] prescribe the forms of any and all
accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept by carriers subject to [the] Act,
including the accounts, records and memoranda of the movement of traffic, as
well as of the receipts and expenditures of moneys.”363 In reviewing the FCC’s
regulations implementing this provision, the Court described its function as
follows:
This court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of
administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative
powers. To show that these have been exceeded in the field of action here
involved, it is not enough that the prescribed system of accounts shall appear
to be unwise or burdensome or inferior to another. Error or unwisdom is not
equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must appear to be “so entirely at
odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting” as to be the expression
of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.364

Similarly, in 1943, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,365 in
upholding FCC regulations governing radio chain broadcasting in the “public
interest, convenience, or necessity” against a claim that the regulations were
arbitrary and capricious, the Court observed,
If this contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely
to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say only
that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a plea. . . . Our duty
is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based upon
findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted

360 DAVIS, supra note 359, § 246, at 885 (recognizing a “large group of cases in which

courts withhold substitution of judgment on non-factual issues involv[ing] what is variously
denominated discretion, policy, or judgment”).
361 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Fed.
Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276–77 (1933); United
States v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255, 257–58 (1929); Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S.
221, 225 (1924); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 470
(1910).
362 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T) v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235 (1936).
363 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 220(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1078 (1934).
364 AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S.
423, 444 (1913)).
365 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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by Congress. It is not for us to say that the “public interest” will be furthered
or retarded by the [Regulations].366

In both of these instances, the FCC’s authority was not unlimited. It is
axiomatic that agencies may not exceed their statutory jurisdiction, so any
regulations the FCC adopted had to be consistent with the text, history, and
purpose of the applicable statute.367 But within those statutory boundaries, the
agency obviously enjoyed tremendous latitude in deciding what rules to adopt.
Traditional tools of statutory interpretation offered little guidance regarding
those details. There was no one right or even best interpretation of the statute in
that regard, only policy choice. And, as with anything else, reasonable people
could disagree over the merits of the choices made, as they did in these cases.368
When traditional statutory interpretation ran out, in the face of a clear delegation
of policymaking discretion from Congress to the agency, the only option for the
Court was assessing reasonableness and then deferring to the FCC’s reasonable
regulations.
Recognizing this reality, in discussing judicial review particularly of agency
rulemaking under the then-newly-enacted APA, Kenneth Culp Davis in 1951
described a “difference between delegated administrative power and
administrative power which is subordinate to independent judicial action.”369
He contended that difference was “the same as that between legislative rules and
interpretative rules,”370 with the former involving the exercise of agency
discretion and the latter representing mere interpretation.371
As late as 1977, in Batterton v. Francis, the Supreme Court recognized this
same distinction.372 The case concerned the validity of a legislative regulation
promulgated pursuant to an express statutory grant of authority to establish
standards, in this instance defining the term “unemployment” for purposes of
determining eligibility for certain welfare payments.373 Citing the AT&T case
from 1936 as well as APA § 706(2)(A) and (C), the Court acknowledged,

366 Id. at 224.
367 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 843

n.9 (1984) (recognizing that agencies and courts both “must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress” and citing several cases spanning fifty years); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (“Executive action under legislatively delegated
authority that might resemble ‘legislative’ action in some respects . . . is always subject to
check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it . . . .”).
368 See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 209 (documenting the dispute over the merits
of the agency’s regulations); AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236 (describing the particular accounting
method choices under challenge).
369 DAVIS, supra note 359, § 249, at 899.
370 Id.
371 Id. § 249, at 899–900.
372 Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–26 (1977).
373 Id. at 418 n.2, 425 (describing the question at issue and quoting the relevant statutory
text).
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In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the
courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In
exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative
effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply
because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.
The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more than mere
deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his
statutory authority or if the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”374

In a footnote, the Court went on to note, by contrast, that it was not required to
give such consideration to “interpretative regulations,” which it described as
“administrative interpretations” eligible only for “[v]arying degrees of
deference . . . based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the
agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise.”375
Aditya Bamzai has offered a different historical account that would seem to
contradict this story. Bamzai argues that both the Supreme Court in Chevron
and scholarly defenses of the Chevron doctrine misconstrued nineteenth century
cases cited in the Chevron decision as supporting judicial deference to agency
legal interpretations.376 He also contends that Congress sought with the APA to
curtail any such deference to agency legal interpretations based on “technical
competence” or “specialized knowledge.”377 Bamzai may be right about
nineteenth century case law and the extent to which courts were willing to defer
to agency interpretations of statutes that could be evaluated using traditional
interpretive methods and tools. But his account overemphasizes the distinction
between questions of law and questions of fact, with little to no attention to early
twentieth century recognition of a third category of question based on
congressional delegation and agency exercises of policymaking discretion.378 It
is this third category that, as described above, is reflected in the APA
374 Id. at 425–26 (citation omitted).
375 Id. at 425 n.9 (distinguishing legislative regulations adopted under specific grants of

rulemaking power from interpretative regulations given more limited deference under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) and other like cases).
376 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126
YALE L.J. 908, 912–14 (2017).
377 Id. at 985–86 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 246–47 (1941)).
378 See id. at 971–76. John Dickinson, on whose work Bamzai relies heavily,
acknowledged this third category of question but gave it minimal attention, perhaps because
such explicit agency discretion was less widespread when he wrote than after the New Deal.
See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 160–63 (1927) (describing the discretion extended to the ICC by the
Hepburn Act, and judicial reluctance to interfere in ICC exercises of such discretionary
authority). Later, the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, which
Bamzai also discusses, recognized questions of discretion uncritically in discussing judicial
review of agency rulemaking. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 116–17 (1941).
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§ 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious standard. And it is this third category that
Chevron acknowledges and captures with its two steps as well as its citation of
cases like AT&T, National Broadcasting, and Batterton, which Bamzai does not
address.379
Bamzai’s analysis also fails to take into account several doctrinal trends
regarding agency rulemaking that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and set the
stage for Chevron. For the first few decades of the APA, agencies did not adopt
broadly-sweeping regulations often, instead either preferring or believing
themselves limited to case-by-case adjudication as a means of articulating
policy-driven interpretations of statutes.380 Partly this reluctance may have been
the consequence of the perceived onerousness of formal rulemaking
procedures.381 Also, however, the consensus view of legal scholars, and
presumably of courts as well, was that the nondelegation doctrine limited
agency authority to adopt legally-binding regulations (as opposed to lesser,
nonbinding interpretative rules) to instances in which Congress specifically
identified the regulations to be adopted.382

379 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 844 n.13
(1984). See generally Bamzai, supra note 378.
380 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1947) (holding that the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication for communicating policy choices is for the agency,
not the courts); see also Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and
Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (2001) (“Before the
1960s agencies acted mainly through case-by-case adjudications. . . . Rulemaking by
agencies played only a minor role in New Deal administration.”).
381 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.06, at 382
(1958) (quoting a Food and Drug Administration official as saying that formal rulemaking
was “costly, time-consuming and not too well adapted for the job to be done” and involved
“[e]xcessive delays, protracted proceedings and mountainous records . . . ”); Robert W.
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276, 1287 (1972)
(describing the sixteen formal rulemakings conducted by the FDA over a decade as
“vary[ing] from unnecessarily drawn out proceedings to virtual disasters” with “drawn out,
repetitious and unproductive” hearings); Nicholas Johnson, The Second Half of
Jurisprudence: The Study of Administrative Decisionmaking, 23 STAN. L. REV. 173, 197
(1970) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969)) (describing formal rulemaking as “often less efficient than adjudication” as
well as “procedurally more cumbersome, consum[ing] more agency resources, and . . . more
susceptible to delaying tactics by the parties”).
382 See, e.g., Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 252, 259–61 (1940); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—
Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 928–29 (1948); see also
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1566–67 (2006) (documenting this consensus).
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Agency rulemaking expanded dramatically starting around the late
1960s.383 The nondelegation doctrine by then was perceived as moribund.384
Agencies began asserting that statutory provisions granting more generalized
rulemaking authority gave them the power to adopt more of their interpretations
as legally-binding regulations.385 Congress also adopted new statutes conferring
additional discretionary authority on agencies.386 Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court’s 1973 decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway387
curtailed sharply the applicability of the APA’s formal rulemaking procedures,
making it easier for agencies to adopt legislative regulations.388 Academics
objected to formal rulemaking as too procedurally onerous but otherwise
highlighted several benefits of rulemaking over adjudication for communicating
policy preferences.389
383 See, e.g., 1 HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 1.6, at 40 (“Rulemaking began

to emerge as the dominant form of regulation in the 1970s.”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3, at 167 (3d ed. 1991) (noting a rise in rulemaking in this period);
Schiller, supra note 380, at 1147 (“Beginning in the 1960s federal agencies’ neglect of
rulemaking began to decline, gradually at first and then with such speed that by the 1970s
commentators declared that the administrative state had entered the ‘age of rulemaking.’”).
384 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 150 (2d
ed. 1978) (describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12, at 34 (1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine “can not
be taken literally”).
385 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 549–70 (2002) (documenting
efforts by the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and National
Labor Relations Board to claim previously unasserted legislative rulemaking authority).
386 See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 1.6, at 40 (making this
observation and offering examples including the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
Consumer Product Safety Act, and statutes administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency).
387 United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236–37 (1973) (holding that formal
rulemaking procedures apply only when a statute expressly requires a hearing “on the
record”).
388 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237,
252–53 (2014) (“The upshot of Florida East Coast Railway is a ‘magic words’
requirement—‘since Florida East Coast Railway, no organic rulemaking statute that does
not contain the specific words “on the record” has ever been held to require formal
rulemaking.’”) (quoting Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857 n.9 (2007)).
389 See, e.g., Warren E. Baker, Policy By Rule or Ad Hoc Approach—Which Should It
Be?, 22 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658, 660–65 (1957) (describing advantages of rulemaking
over adjudication); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 513–28 (1970) (describing pros and cons of rulemaking and adjudication as varying
depending on the circumstances but recognizing many benefits of rulemaking); David L.
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 929–42 (1965) (reviewing the advantages of rulemaking over
adjudication).
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Another major doctrinal shift around this time concerned justiciability
doctrine. In its 1967 decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme
Court interpreted the APA’s judicial review provisions as establishing a
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement review of agency rules and
regulations.390 Prior to that decision, the Court had been reluctant to consider
challenges to the validity of agency regulations unless and until an agency
attempted to enforce a rule in a specific case, and thereby threatened to impose
a specific type of injury such as a fine or other legal sanction.391 After Abbott
Labs, pre-enforcement judicial review of claims that agency regulations
exceeded statutory authority or were otherwise arbitrary and capricious became
the norm.392 Additionally, the Court’s 1970 decision in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp relaxed statutory standing
requirements and allowed more people to challenge the actions of agencies
under the APA.393
These changes in legal doctrine and administrative practice meant that, by
the late 1970s, courts found themselves tasked more often with reviewing
agency regulations that were sweeping in scope and doing so on a facial rather
than an as-applied basis.394 As Reuel Schiller documented, courts familiar with
“deploying more or less strict scrutiny” under the APA’s de novo, substantial
evidence, and arbitrary and capricious standards of review “increase[d] the
intensity with which they reviewed rulemaking.”395 Surveying the different
ways to police agency rulemaking explored by the D.C. Circuit as well as
Congress and the Administrative Conference of the United States, Schiller
particularly linked the expansion of agency rulemaking to an activist D.C.
Circuit’s development of “hard look review,”396 which the Supreme Court
embraced as a construction of the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA
§ 706(2)(A) in its 1983 State Farm decision.397 It is not difficult to imagine a
similar evolution of APA § 706(2)(A) with Chevron, as courts grappled with the
policymaking inherent in agencies relying on general authority rulemaking
390 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
391 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 77, 89

(1947) (characterizing employee challenge to civil service rules interpreting the Hatch Act
as a request for an advisory opinion); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206,
§ 17.12 (describing pre-Abbott Labs judicial approach to ripeness).
392 See HICKMAN & PIERCE, JR., supra note 206, § 17.14 (“After Abbott Labs, preenforcement review of rules became the norm in the large class of cases in which the
challenge to the rule’s validity raised one or more issues that were susceptible to judicial
resolution before the rule was applied.”).
393 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970); see
also 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:9 (2d ed. 1983)
(describing the expansion of standing doctrine).
394 See Schiller, supra note 380, at 1155.
395 Id. at 1155–56.
396 Id. at 1155–56, 1170.
397 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42–44 (1983).
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grants to resolve self-identified statutory ambiguities for which traditional
interpretive tools offered no clear answer.

C. Chevron’s Continued Evolution
As a standard of review, it is hardly surprising that Chevron itself has
evolved incrementally over time through various clarifications and adjustments
as agency practices and other administrative law doctrines have changed and as
individual cases challenging agency statutory interpretations have raised
questions about Chevron’s domain and application piecemeal. Sometimes the
Supreme Court has applied the Chevron doctrine more expansively, for example
to interpretive policymaking through adjudication as well as rulemaking and to
jurisdictional questions.398 In other instances, the Court has pared Chevron
back, for example by rejecting it for agency actions lacking legal force399 as
well as certain major questions.400 The Court has waffled on the significance of
contextual factors like longevity and consistency in Chevron analysis.401 The
debates over some of these questions can be arcane and overly complexifying.
Justice Scalia in particular pushed for a more rule-like approach to Chevron
in the doctrine’s early years, undoubtedly in pursuit of his general preference
for rules over standards.402 As William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented,
however, Justice Scalia was among the least likely of his colleagues to actually
defer to an agency statutory interpretation.403 He embraced a robust approach to
Chevron step one that involved applying traditional tools of statutory
interpretation assertively, and he suggested on at least one occasion that he
rarely needed to defer to an agency because he had no difficulty finding statutory
clarity.404 The fact that his colleagues were less inclined to pursue statutory
clarity as aggressively themselves does not undermine Chevron’s categorization
as a standard of review. If anything, as discussed, that malleability corresponds
to characterizing Chevron in this way.
The resulting doctrinal twists and turns perhaps make today’s Chevron a
little or even a lot different from the Chevron of thirty years ago. The same can
be said, however, of the State Farm approach to arbitrary and capricious review

398 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–301 (2013).
399 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237–39 (2001).
400 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
401 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20, 222 (2002); Brown v. Gardner, 513

U.S. 115, 122 (1994). See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency
Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015).
402 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 34, at 65 (describing Justice Scalia’s preference for
rules over standards and offering six reasons why).
403 See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 84, at 1154.
404 Scalia, supra note 135, at 520–21.
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or the substantial evidence standard, both of which the Supreme Court has
continued to clarify and refine.405
The Court’s frequent failure to signal that Chevron provides the appropriate
standard of review, or even to mention Chevron at all in some cases when its
application might seem appropriate, does not negate Chevron’s categorization
as such.406 As Frederick Liu has observed, “when the statute’s meaning is clear,
the choice among Chevron, Skidmore, or some other standard is moot—which
probably explains why, in the majority of cases the Court hears in which an
agency construction is available, the Court declines to invoke any deference
regime whatsoever.”407

V. CONCLUSION
Where does this leave us? Courts and litigants struggle with Chevron in part
because they cannot agree about how Chevron works or the circumstances in
which Chevron ought to apply. Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review
will not answer every question that arises about the doctrine nor is it likely to
make a difference in most cases. This Article does not claim to sweep so widely.
Nevertheless, contemplating Chevron’s categorical alternatives provides a
theoretical starting point for resolving at least some of Chevron’s issues.
Categorizing Chevron gives courts facing certain issues a coherent baseline
for their analysis, rather than forcing them to struggle ad hoc with every new
debate. At present, waiver and stare decisis are the most obvious Chevron
questions that may be informed by the insights of this Article. Standards of
review cannot be waived, so if Chevron is a standard of review, it is not
waivable. If Chevron is a standard of review because it is a construction of the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, then the Court seems more likely to
clarify and refine it than to overturn it entirely.
Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review, rather than as a rule of
decision or a canon of construction, turns the doctrine’s pervasiveness and
malleability into strengths rather than weaknesses and best recognizes and
effectuates the premises that gave rise to Chevron in the first place. Properly
understood as a standard of review and as an interpretation of APA § 706,
Chevron respects the traditional role of the courts by allowing them to use the
405 See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569, 2574–76 (2019)
(rejecting “pretextual” or “contrived reasons” as adequate for reasoned decisionmaking
under § 706(2)(A) and State Farm); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155–56 (2019)
(concluding that the testimony of an expert witness who refuses to disclose the data
supporting her testimony can be substantial evidence); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (rejecting “heightened” review under State Farm and the arbitrary
and capricious standard when an agency changes its mind).
406 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct.
789, 789–90 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., statement) (noting that the Court “has often
declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it”).
407 Liu, supra note 195, at 335 n.302.
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full range of methods and tools to interpret statutory text and find statutory
meaning. But Chevron also reminds the courts that they are not the sole source
of wisdom in our current system of governance. As long as Congress continues
to delegate significant policymaking discretion to agencies, courts must be leery
of intruding too deeply into the policy sphere under the guise of interpretation.
Categorizing Chevron as a standard of review should help the courts maintain
that proper balance.

